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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CAMILLE CASTILLO JOHNSON, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. 
TRAVIS PAUL JOHNSON, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
District Court No. 044907342 
Appellate No. 20061003-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Decree of 
Divorce, Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of 
Divorce, of the Utah Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding. Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon 
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953 
as amended) and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court err when it found that the appreciation in the 
property located at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, Draper, Utah, 84020 was Appellee's 
separate property, even though the appreciation occurred during the marriage, the 
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property was purchased during the marriage, Respondent supervised the landscaping and 
other activities enhancing the real property, and Respondent contributed over $24,682.35 
that went toward payments on the mortgage principal and interest, and improvements to 
the real property? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's property division will be modified when 
"there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Naranjo v. 
Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(citing English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409, 410 (Utah 1977); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court err when it awarded Appellee $10,000.00 that she 
paid for Appellant's medical bills, when there was no agreement between the parties that 
the money paid for medical bills be reimbursed, and the record evidence is not clear as to 
when the surgery occurred, and subsequently, when the bill for the medical bills were 
paid? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's property division will be modified when 
"there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Naranjo v. 
Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988Xciting English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409, 410 (Utah 1977); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules are relevant to this 
appeal: 
Statutes: 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(1) (1953 as amended): 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts 
or obligations, and parties. . . 
2. Utah Code Annotated Section 30-4-3(l)(c) (1953 as amended): 
(1) In all actions brought under this chapter the court may by 
order or decree: 
(c) award to either spouse the possession of any 
real or personal property of the other spouse or 
acquired by the spouses during the marriage. 
Rules: 
1. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9): 
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner and Appellee, Camille Castillo-Johnson ("Petitioner"), by and through 
counsel, filed a Complaint for Divorce in this matter against Respondent and Appellant, 
Travis Paul Johnson, on or about December 20, 2004. R. at 1-6.1 In her Complaint for 
Divorce, Petitioner alleged that "[t]he marital home located at 1892 East Deep Woods 
1
 There will be two separate citations to the Record on Appeal in this Brief. The court 
record of pleadings and papers shall be referred to as "R. page number." The Transcript 
of Proceedings shall be referred to as "Tr. Page number." 
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Drive, Draper, Utah, 84020, should be awarded to Petitioner, along with the indebtedness 
thereon." R. at 4: 24. 
Respondent and Appellant, Travis Paul Johnson, ("Respondent") filed 
Respondent's Verified Answer to Petitioner's Complaint for Divorce and Respondent's 
Counter Petition, on or about January 18, 2005, denying Petitioner's allegations. R. at 
30-55. Respondent further alleged that "[d]uring the course of the marriage, the parties 
acquired certain real property to wit: a. A home located at 1892 Deep Woods Drive, 
Draper, Utah 84020, more particularly described as follows: Lot 36 OAK VISTA 1 AT 
SUNCREST Sec 3409." R. at 48: 21. Further, "[s]aid real property should be sold as 
soon as reasonably practicable and the proceeds of the sale should be applied as follows: 
i. First, pay expenses of sale; ii. Second, retire any and all mortgages and liens; iii. Third, 
pay all marital debts and obligations; iv. Last, the balance remaining thereafter to be 
divided equally between the parties." R. at 48: 21. 
A bench trial was held on May 3, 2006, May 9, 2006 and July 6, 2006, before the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis. R. at 694, 701, 723 and 740. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were signed on August 26, 2006, and entered September 12, 2006. 
R. at 701 and 716. The Decree and Judgment Resolving all Issues and Permanent Mutual 
Restraining Order was also signed August 26, 2006 and entered September 12, 2006. R. 
at 694 and 700. Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed on 
September 19, 2006 and entered September 26, 2006. R. at 723 and 739. The Amended 
Decree and Judgment Resolving all Issues and Permanent Mutual Restraining Order was 
4 
also signed on September 19, 2006 and entered September 26, 2006. R. at 740 and 747. 
In both the Findings of Fact and the Amended Findings of Fact, regarding the real 
property located at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, Draper, Utah, 84020 ("real property"), 
the trial court found that: 
[t]he real property situated at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, Draper, Utah, 
84020 was purchased by Petitioner from her separate, pre-marital funds and 
assets. Title to said real property was taken by Petitioner individually. 
Respondent was never included or named as an owner on the title to said 
real property. Petitioner was the sole applicant of and obligor on the 
obligation which encumbers the real property. All payments of the 
mortgage principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate 
funds. All payments of the real property taxes and insurance were made by 
Petitioner from her separate funds. 
R. at 705 and 727. The trial court consequently stated in its Conclusions of Law and 
Amended Conclusions of Law that the real property "is and always has been Petitioner's 
separate property and all appreciation in value of said real property is Petitioner's 
separate property." R. at 712 and 734-735. The resulting Decree and Judgment 
Resolving all Issues and Permanent Mutual Protective Order ("Decree") and the 
Amended Decree subsequently awarded the real property to Appellee, including the 
appreciation, stating that the same were "separate property." R. at 697 and 744. 
In regard to Respondent's personal injury settlement, the trial court stated in both 
its Findings of Fact and Amended Findings of Fact the following: 
[djuring the marriage of the parties Respondent received a personal injury 
settlement of approximately $24,000.00 which was deposited into 
Petitioner's individual checking account. Petitioner paid approximately 
$10,000.00 for Respondent's medical bills for injuries received in the 
incident giving rise to the personal injury settlement. Petitioner should 
reimburse Respondent the sum of $14,000.00. 
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R. at 705 and 727-728. The Conclusions of Law and Amended Conclusions of Law 
stated the same. R. at 712-713 and 735. The Decree and Amended Decree then provided 
"Petitioner is hereby ordered to reimburse Respondent the sum of $14,000.00 of 
Respondent's personal injury settlement received during the marriage of the parties. R. at 
698 and 744. 
Near the conclusion of proceedings, Judge Lewis stated that she felt her decision 
regarding the real property "may be wrong under the law" and that "I may be reversed on 
appeal." Tr. at 215: 3-4. This Appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on October 4, 2002 in Salt Lake City, State of Utah. R. 
at land 35. There was one child born during the course of the parties' marriage, Gabriel 
Golden Johnson, on January 1, 2003. R. at 2 and 35. The parties separated on or about 
October 19, 2004. R. at 1 and 35. During the course of the marriage real property was 
acquired located at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, Draper, Utah, 84020. R. at 48 1 21(a) 
and 5 6 1 1 . 
Petitioner was burned as a child in an incident where an individual was throwing 
fire crackers which resulted in a fire in the vehicle. Tr. at 28: 3-16. As a result, 
Petitioner received injuries that required several surgeries. Tr. at 30: 19-25 and 31: 1-6. 
Petitioner received a substantial settlement as a result of her injuries. Tr. at 29: 8-23. 
Before the parties were married, Petitioner was aware of Respondent's meager financial 
situation, had a firm grasp of her own assets and worth, and had access to legal services, 
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but declined to have Respondent sign a prenuptial agreement. Tr. at 157: 3-25, 158: 1-25 
and 159: 1-17. At the time the real property was purchased, Petitioner had one million 
dollars in a structured trust fund. Tr. at 158: 17-23. The real property acquired during 
the marriage was purchased for $544,000.00. Tr. at 165: 18-19. When the real property 
purchased, the down payment of $272,500.00 was paid by Petitioner. Tr. at 165: 20-21. 
Respondent is not on the deed for the home. R. at 705 and 727. 
Respondent was injured in a car accident prior to the parties' marriage. Tr. at 96: 
21-22. Petitioner paid for some of the medical expenses incurred from Respondent's 
injuries out of her own personal funds; in particular, a surgery on Appellant's back. Tr. 
at 96: 17-22, There was no agreement that Respondent would reimburse Petitioner for 
her payment of these medical expenses. Tr. at 97: 12-18. Respondent received a 
settlement from his personal injuries that included an annuity in the amount of at least 
$24,635.37. Tr. at 106: 3-82. That amount went into Petitioner's personal account, to 
which Respondent did not have access. Tr. at 106: 3-13. Payments for the mortgage 
principal and interest were made out of this account, as well as for other improvements to 
the real property. Tr. at 153: 23-25, 154: 1-7, 167: 18-25, 168: 1-9 and Exhibit 15. 
While the parties were married, and after the real property was acquired, Respondent did 
2
 The amount of Respondent's settlement that was placed in Petitioner's personal account 
varied throughout the trial. Tr. at 106: 3-8 states that the amount was $24,635.37, while 
Tr. at 166: 12-14 states that the amount was $24,682.35; the difference being $46.98. 
However, Exhibit 16 shows the correct amount of $24,682.35. As such, Respondent 
states that $24,682.35 is the correct amount. Citations to the record, in particular, the 
transcript, have not been corrected to match the amount in Exhibit 16, in an effort to 
quote directly and accurately from the record and transcript. 
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tile work on the home. Tr. at 100:3-18. Respondent also participated in landscaping of 
the real property. Tr. at 99: 25 and 100: 1-2. Respondent also cared for the parties' 
minor child. Tr. at 174: 15-19 and 203: 13-18. Since the parties have been separated, the 
parties' minor child spends eight (8) hours a day, three (3) days a week in day care. Tr. at 
163:6-9. 
After the parties' separation, Petitioner acquired another home, which was 
purchased, in cash, for $168,000.00. Tr. at 166: 24-25 and 167: 1-3. Petitioner is able to 
still make payments on the real property that was acquired during the marriage. Tr. at 
166: 5-7. Petitioner has not had a surgery in approximately nine years. Tr. at 167: 8-11. 
Petitioner receives $9,305.00 per month, tax free, from her personal injury settlements. 
Tr. at 158: 9-16. Petitioner has a lifetime annuity that has an accelerator of 3% a year to 
take care of inflation. Tr. at 29:24-25 and 30:1-2. There was no testimony during the 
proceedings indicating how much additional surgeries would cost. 
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found that the real property was 
separate property and awarded it, as well as any appreciation, to Petitioner. R. at 705, 
712, 727, and 734-735. The trial court also required Petitioner to return $14,000.00 of 
approximately $24,000.00 that constituted Respondent's personal injury award, after 




The trial court's finding that the appreciation in the real property acquired during 
the marriage is separate property, and its subsequent decision to award the same to 
Petitioner, should be reversed. It was the result of both a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law, resulted in substantial and prejudicial error, and the record 
evidence is clearly preponderated against some of the findings that the trial court based 
its decision on. The trial court's finding is wrong for these reasons. 
First, the trial court stated in its findings that all payments of the mortgage 
principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. R. at 705 and 
727. This finding is not supported by the record evidence. Rather, it is clear from the 
record evidence that funds Respondent obtained from his personal injury settlement 
ultimately were deposited into Petitioner's personal account from which Petitioner 
acknowledged that payments from the mortgage were paid. Second, applying the 
findings that were made by the trial court to the relevant law, it is clear that the trial 
court's decision must be reversed. Respondent contributed assets and time to the 
enhancement of the real property purchased during the marriage. Further, there is 
evidence that Petitioner may have contributed the home to the marriage. As a result, the 
appreciation in the real property should have been classified as marital, and the 
appreciation divided equally between the parties. Failure to do so resulted in a serious 
inequity since Respondent was not compensated for his contributions toward the real 
property. Finally, the trial court made no specific finding as to exceptional circumstances 
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that would justify an unequal division of the marital property. The one statement that the 
trial court made that could possibly constitute such a finding, which focused on the cost 
of future surgeries, is not supported by the record. There was no evidence presented 
regarding how much future surgeries may cost, or whether Petitioner cannot adequately 
pay for these future surgeries. Further, the record evidence does not indicate that 
exceptional circumstances exist. At the very least, this case must be remanded so that a 
determination can be made in that regard. 
The trial court also erred in allowing Petitioner to retain $10,000.00 of 
Respondent's personal injury settlement, as reimbursement for Respondent's surgery that 
was paid by Petitioner. There was no evidence of an agreement between the parties that 
Respondent would reimburse Petitioner. Also, there is inadequate record evidence as to 
when the surgery occurred, requiring a remand so that it can be determined if the medical 
expenses should be reimbursed to Petitioner. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE APPRECIATION IN THE 
REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING THE MARRIAGE WAS 
SEPARATE PROPERTY SHOULD BE REVERSED, SINCE IT WAS 
THE RESULT OF A MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISAPPLICATION OF 
THE LAW RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL AND PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR, AND THE EVIDENCE IS CLEARLY PREPONDERATED 
AGAINST THE FINDINGS, 
The trial court found that the appreciation in the real property acquired during the 
marriage was separate property. The Findings of Fact and Amended Findings of Fact 
indicate that the trial court based this determination on the following: 1. it was purchased 
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by Petitioner from her separate, pre-marital funds and assets, specifically, from her 
personal injury settlement; 2. Respondent was never included or named as an owner on 
the "title" to the real property; 3. Petitioner was the sole applicant of and obligor on the 
obligation which encumbers the real property; 4. all payments of the mortgage principal 
and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds; and 5. all payments of the 
real property taxes and insurance were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. R. at 
705 and 727. In Utah, a trial court's property division will be modified when "there was 
a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 
1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(citing English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 
1977); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
Under the above standard, the trial court's finding regarding the real property was 
wrong and the decision of the trial court should be reversed. First, after marshaling the 
record evidence, it is clear that the trial court's findings that all payments of the mortgage 
principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds is not supported 
by the record. Second, after applying the law to the remaining findings by the trial court 
regarding the real property, it is also clear that the trial court's decision was the result of a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, and should be reversed, or at a minimum, 
remanded. 
11 
A. BECAUSE RESPONDENT IS CHALLENGING A FACT FINDING MADE 
BY THE TRIAL COURT, APPELLANT MUST MARSHAL THE 
RECORD EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE FINDING. 
Respondent challenges fact finding conducted by the trial court regarding the real 
property at issue in this matter. The trial court found that: 
[t]he real property situated at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, Draper, Utah, 
84020 was purchased by Petitioner from her separate, pre-marital funds and 
assets. Title to said real property was taken by Petitioner individually. 
Respondent was never included or named as an owner on the title to said 
real property. Petitioner was the sole applicant of and obligor on the 
obligation which encumbers the real property. All payments of the 
mortgage principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate 
funds. All payments of the real property taxes and insurance were made by 
Petitioner from her separate funds. 
R. at 705 and 727. Respondent does not challenge all of these findings. It is not disputed 
that the real property was purchased by Appellee from her separate, pre-marital funds and 
assets, specifically, from her personal injury settlement. R. at 705 and 727. Also, it is 
not disputed that Respondent was never included or named as an owner on the "title" to 
the real property. Id. Further, it is not disputed that Petitioner was the sole applicant of 
and obligor on the obligation which encumbers the real property. Id. Finally, it is not 
disputed that all payments of the real property taxes and insurance were made by 
Petitioner from her separate funds. Id. However, it is disputed that all payments of the 
mortgage principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. Id. 
The Rules of Appellate Procedure state "[a] party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). Further, Respondent must "marshal all evidence in favor of the facts as found 
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by the trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact." 
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). There is little evidence 
in the record to support the contested finding. After marshaling the evidence, it is clear 
that the trial court's findings that all payments of the mortgage principal and interest were 
made by Petitioner from her separate funds are not supported by the record evidence. 
The Marshaled Evidence in Support of the Finding: 
Testimony of Petitioner: 
Petitioner testified that Respondent's personal injury settlement was not used to 
pay for the mortgage: 
MR. RICHMAN: And when Travis got his settlement, he got a net sum of 
he testifies is around $27,000, might be $24,000. He says it was $27,000 and then 
what ended up in your account was $24,000 something and he said that the 
difference of about $3,000 was used to pay the mortgage on the house. Did you 
hear that testimony? 
PETITIONER: I did. 
MR. RICHMAN: Is that true? 
PETITIONER: No. 
MR. RICHMAN: Did he ever provide any money to pay the mortgage on 
the house? 
PETITIONER: Not that I'm aware of, no. 
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MR. RICHMAN: Okay. And how was the mortgage serviced? Is it a 
direct payment? 
PETITIONER: It is now. Usually I get on line and I pay the payment and 
just so I don't have to think about it every month, it is direct. 
MR. RICHMAN: But you paid it from your individual account, correct? 
PETITIONER: Yes. 
MR. RICHMAN: Never from the other one? 
PETITIONER: No. 
MR. RICHMAN: Did Travis ever earn any money during the time you 
were married? 
PETITIONER: No. 
Tr .at l53: 11-25 and 154: 1-10. 
There was testimony from Petitioner regarding how the accounts were set up, and 
which expenses were paid from which accounts. 
MR. RICHMAN: Up at the top of the application it shows account No. 
1827028, do you see that? 
PETITIONER: Yes. 
MR. RICHMAN: Is that your individual account at American First Credit 
Union? 
PETITIONER: Yes, only it's University of Utah. 
Tr. 140:4-10. 
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MR. RICHMAN: That is and always has been your personal, individual 
account? 
PETITIONER: Yes. 
MR. RICHMAN: No one else has been authorized to sign on that? 
PETITIONER: No. 
MR. RICHMAN: And if you turn over to Tab 17, that appears to be a joint 
account at the same institution? 
PETITIONER: Yes. 
MR. RICHMAN: The joint account is with you and Travis, correct? 
PETITIONER: Yes. 
Tr. 140: 14-23. 
MR. RICHMAN: And do you recall why that account was opened? 
PETITIONER: Yes. 
MR. RICHMAN: Would you tell this Court why? 
PETITIONER: So Travis, because he didn't work, so he could have 
expenditures, so he could write checks. I didn't trust him to be on my own 
account. I could put money in there and not have to worry about it. 
Tr. 141:3-9. 
MR. RICHMAN: And did you ever use the joint account? 
PETITIONER: Not really, no. 
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MR. RICHMAN: When you say not really, you're kind of hedging a little 
bit. Was the joint account used by you for regular expenses? 
PETITIONER: No. 
MR. RICHMAN: For any expenses? 
PETITIONER: Travis would take me out to dinner so myself, no. 
Tr. 142:4-11. 
Testimony of Respondent: 
MR. RICHMAN: Tell me about your earnings, actual earnings from your 
employment or work since the time of your marriage in October of 2002. 
RESPONDENT: Employment earnings since the marriage? 
MR. RICHMAN: My understanding from your testimony in depositions is 
the last job you had was with Linda's Furniture. 
RESPONDENT: That is correct. 
MR. RICHMAN: And that that preceded the marriage? 
RESPONDENT: Yes. 
Tr. 78: 5-13. 
THE COURT: You haven't had employment then since the marriage up 
until recently? 
RESPONDENT: Yeah, since before the marriage actually. 
THE COURT: But you haven't started work yet? 
RESPONDENT: No. 
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THE COURT: So before the marriage you were unemployed after you left 
the one place and you're still unemployed but you're starting work on Monday; is 
that right? 
RESPONDENT: Yes. 
Tr. 78: 18-25 and 79:1-2. 
Evidence Against the Finding: 
Despite the above record evidence, there was clear evidence showing Respondent 
did contribute funds to the account that paid for the mortgage principal and interest. 
i 
Exhibits introduced at trial show that Respondent's personal injury funds were placed in 
Petitioner's account from which she admitted that mortgage payments were made. 
Specifically, Exhibit 17 shows the amount of $27,500.00 being placed in the joint 
account (account # 1939679) on June 2, 2004. Tr. at 140: 19-22. Later, on September 
11, 2004, Petitioner's personal account (account # 1827028) showed a deposit in the 
amount of $24,682.35. Tr. at 140 4-10 & Exhibit 16, 9/11/2004. During trial Petitioner 
also testified to the following: 
MR. RICHMAN: When Travis did get his settlement money was there any 
effort made to pay you back for the surgery? 
PETITIONER: No, not that I can recall. 
MR. RICHMAN: He didn't say take some of this, instead of me paying for 
my surgery which you did, you take it back? He didn't say that? How did the 
$24,000 some odd end up in your individual account? 
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PETITIONER: Because he put it there. 
Tr. at 155:7-14. While it is not entirely clear who actually put the money in the account, 
Petitioner does acknowledge in this instance that the money did go into her personal 
account. Further, on examination regarding the landscaping, Petitioner testified to the 
following: 
MR. BARKER3: Isn't it true that that was taken out of your personal 
account on September 15, 2004, that was just four days after Travis put the 
$24,000 into your account? 
PETITIONER: I don't have paperwork, I don't know. 
MR. BARKER: May I approach the witness, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BARKER: This is (inaudible) right? 
PETITIONER: I see that, yes. 
MR. BARKER: You see on September 11, $24,000 put in, right? 
PETITIONER: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. BARKER: And then you see here where the $7,637 was taken out, 
correct? 
PETITIONER: Yes. 
MR. BARKER: Just four days after, right? 
3
 The transcript indicates that cross-examination of Petitioner was conducted by co-
counsel, Bradley J. Schofield. However, cross-examination of Petitioner was actually 
conducted by attorney Samuel M. Barker. The record is accurate besides this minor 
discrepancy. 
18 
PETITIONER: It looks like it. 
Tr. at 167: 19-25 and 168: 1-9. Respondent confirmed this during direct examination by 
Petitioner's attorney: 
MR. RICHMAN: Did the $27,000 you claim you got from your injury go 
into the joint account? 
RESPONDENT: No, it went into her account. 
Tr. at 96: 11-13. Further: 
MR. RICHMAN: You didn't have individual funds of yours from any 
source including perhaps earnings to buy the slate, correct? 
RESPONDENT: No, I turned all my earnings and everything I had over to 
her. 
THE COURT: What earnings? Your annuity? 
RESPONDENT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Because that was your only source of income, was it not? 
RESPONDENT: Yeah, that is true. 
Tr. at 103: 14-22. On direct examination: 
MR. SCHOFIELD: Travis, I'm going to show you a copy of this, and on 9-
11, do you see the deposit made for $24,635.37 I believe it is? 
RESPONDENT: Yes. 
MR. SCHOFIELD: What was that deposit? 
RESPONDENT: That was the annuity that I was given. 
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MR. SCHOFIELD: And what account number is that in? Can you read in 
the top lefthand [sic] corner? 
RESPONDENT: 1827028. 
MR. SCHOFIELD: And is that Camille's personal account? 
RESPONDENT: Yes it is. 
MR. SCHOFIELD: So that was the check that you received from your 
personal injury? 
RESPONDENT: Yes. 
Tr. 106:3-16. Further: 
MR. SCHOFIELD: Okay, but the one thing you are sure of is that you did 
give her - and it shows in her bank account $24,635.37,1 believe is the . . . 
RESPONDENT: Yes. 
Tr. I l l : 18-21. Petitioner acknowledged that payments for the mortgage were made 
from her personal account, the account where Respondent's personal injury funds 
ultimately were deposited. Tr. at 153: 23-25 and 154: 1-7 and Exhibit 16, 9/11/2004. 
The record evidence simply does not show that all of the mortgage principal and 
interest payments were made by Petitioner solely from her separate funds. While the 
record evidence does not show where Respondent's funds were applied, it is clear that 
Respondent's personal injury funds were placed in Petitioner's personal account where 
payments for the mortgage principal and interest were paid from. As such this Court 
should find that the trial court's finding that all payments of the mortgage principal and 
20 
interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds, was not based on sufficient 
record evidence, even after construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 
court. 
B. THIS COURT MUST REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DETERMINATION THAT THE APPRECIATION IN THE REAL 
PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING THE MARRIAGE WAS SEPARATE 
PROPERTY. 
The trial court awarded the appreciation in the real property at issue in this matter, 
to the Petitioner because it found that it was separate property. See R. 705, 712, 727 and 
734-735. The trial court based its conclusions on the following: 
[t]he real property situated at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, Draper, Utah, 
84020 was purchased by Petitioner from her separate, pre-marital funds and 
assets. Title to said real property was taken by Petitioner individually. 
Respondent was never included or named as an owner on the title to said 
real property. Petitioner was the sole applicant of and obligor on the 
obligation which encumbers the real property. All payments of the 
mortgage principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate 
funds. All payments of the real property taxes and insurance were made by 
Petitioner from her separate funds. 
R. at 705 and 727. As was argued above, the trial court's finding that payments for the 
mortgage principal and interest were paid from Petitioner's separate funds, was not 
adequately supported by the record evidence. The remaining findings, that the real 
property was purchased by Appellee from her separate, pre-marital funds and assets, 
specifically, from her personal injury settlement; that Respondent was never included or 
named as an owner on the "title" to the real property; that Petitioner was the sole 
applicant of and obligor on the obligation which encumbers the real property and; that 
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Petitioner paid for the property taxes, do not justify the trial court's determination that the 
appreciation in the real property is Petitioner's separate property. R. at 705 and 727. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated "[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled to 
all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Thomas v. 
Thomas, 987 P.2d 603, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); See also Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 
1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("once a court makes a finding that a specific item is marital 
property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties55). Further, 
"[mjarital property is ordinarily all property acquired during marriage and it 
'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever 
obtained and from whatever source derived.555 Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-1318 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988). A 
trial court should award separate property back to that spouse, including "appreciation or 
enhancement of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense 
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby 
acquiring an equitable interest in i t . . . or (2) the property has been consumed or its 
identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made 
a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse.55 Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 
308 (Utah 1988); See also Dunn 802 P.2d at 1321 ("[p]remarital property may lose its 
separate distinction where the parties have inextricably commingled it into the marital 
estate, or where one spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital 
estate.55) Any deviation from the rule that the marital estate be divided equally "is only 
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justified when the trial court 'memorialize^] in commendably detailed findings' the 
exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT 
App. 373,127, 993 P.2d 887 (citingThomas, 987 P.2d at 609). 
In this case, a proper application of the law to the facts shows that the appreciation 
in the real property purchased during the marriage should be divided equally, after all 
encumbrances on the property are paid, and both Petitioner and Respondent are 
reimbursed for the sums they each contributed to the real property. Further, there are no 
extraordinary circumstances supported by the record evidence that would require an 
unequal distribution of the appreciation in the real property. 
1. THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
NOT DIVIDING THE APPRECIATION IN THE MARITAL HOME 
EQUALLY BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT. 
The trial court erred when it found that the appreciation in the real property 
purchased during the marriage was separate property, and awarded the same to Petitioner. 
R. at 712 and 734-735. Instead, the real property should have been ordered sold, and any 
encumbrances on the house should have been paid, then Petitioner should have been 
awarded the funds that she paid as a down payment for the house and Respondent should 
have been awarded the sums that he paid into Petitioner's account. The remaining 
appreciation should then have been divided equally. The trial court's findings that the 
real property was purchased by Petitioner from her separate, pre-marital funds and assets, 
specifically, from her personal injury settlement; Respondent was never included or 
named as an owner on the "title" to the real property and; Petitioner was the sole 
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applicant of and obligor on the obligation which encumbers the real property and; that 
Petitioner paid the property taxes, do not justify the awarding of the appreciation in the 
real property solely to Petitioner. R.
 fat 705 and 727. 
As was stated above, "[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her 
separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Thomas, 987 P.2d at 610. 
Further, "[m]arital property is ordinarily all property acquired during marriage and it 
'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever 
obtained and from whatever source derived.555 Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1317-1318 quoting 
Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1079. Finally, a trial court should award separate property back to 
that spouse, including "appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1) the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, 
or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in i t . . . or (2) the 
property has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or 
where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse.59 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988); See also Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1321 
("[p]remarital property may lose its separate distinction where the parties have 
inextricably commingled it into the marital estate, or where one spouse has contributed 
all or part of the property to the marital estate.55) 
In this case, the appreciation in the real property should be considered marital 
property. Respondent's efforts and expense have contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of the real property, and Respondent has an equitable interest 
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as a result. Respondent received a settlement from his personal injuries that included an 
annuity in the amount of at least $24,635.37, a sizeable amount to most people. Tr. at 
106: 3-8. That amount went into Petitioner's personal account, to which Respondent did 
not have access. Tr. at 106: 3-13 and Exhibit 16. Payments for the home were made out 
nf this account. Tr. at 153: 23-25 and 154: 1-7. While the parties were married, and after 
the real property was acquired, Respondent did tile work on the home. Tr. at 100:3-18. 
Respondent also supervised landscaping of the real property and the installation of the 
home theatre. Tr. at 156: 14-16; and 166: 1-4 & 7-9. After Respondent's personal injury 
funds were deposited into Petitioner's personal account, the landscaping was paid for 
from that account. Tr. at 167: 14-25; 168: 1-9 and Exhibit 15. At the close of 
proceedings, the trial court stated in regard to the $24,635.37 that constituted a portion of 
Respondent's personal injury settlement, "[i]t appears that the $24,000 or whatever that 
was put into her account was used in part for landscaping." Tr. at 209:8-9. Further, "I'll 
assume that the rest of it went to tile, and that's giving him the benefit of the doubt 
because there's not proof of that and the house goes to her." Tr. at 209: 12-14. Clearly 
money and effort by Respondent enhanced the real property and paid for expenses 
regarding the real property. As was shown above, even the trial court noted that 
Respondent contributed financially to the enhancement of the real property. Tr. at 209:8-
9 and Tr. at 209: 12-14. Respondent also contributed to care of the parties' only minor 
child. Tr. at 174: 15-19 and 203: 13-18. 
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Whether or not Respondent was an equal contributor financially is irrelevant. 
Factors in property division "do not include a consideration of which partner was the 
more economically productive during the marriage." Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1322. Any such 
analysis would be flawed because it "ignores contributions of love, encouragement, and 
companionship, which elude monetary valuation . . . [and] gives short shrift to spouses 
who contribute homemaking skills and child care." Id. Consider also Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987). In that case the plaintiff, Kathryn Newmeyer, 
had invested $55,000.00 to $60,000.00 of an inheritance to purchase homes. Newmeyer, 
745 P.2d at 1277-1278. The defendant, Jeddy Newmeyer, had contributed $7,000.00 to 
$12,000.00. Id. at 1278. The trial court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to the 
amounts she had contributed towards the homes, but that the equity was marital property 
and should be divided equally. Id. at 1277. The Utah Supreme Court determined that the 
trial court had acted appropriately when it awarded Jeddy Newmeyer "an equal share in 
the appreciation of the value of the homes despite his much lower contribution." Id. at 
1278. Consider also Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) where the trial 
court determined that a home was marital property then took one party's contribution of 
an inheritance to the purchase of a home out of the other party's equity, rather than 
simply taking the total equity, reimbursing one party for its contribution, and then 
dividing the remainder. Id. at 1022. The Court of Appeals ultimately remanded the case 
"to give the trial judge an opportunity to enter findings supporting the unequal 
distribution, or, in the alternative, to divide the proceeds from the sale of the home 
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equally after first subtracting the amount necessary to reimburse appellee's contribution." 
Id. at 1023. Under the applicable law, Respondent's lower financial contribution should 
not strip him of an equal'portion of the appreciation in the real property acquired during 
the marriage. 
Petitioner's actions also show that she intended the real property to be a 
contribution of "all or part of the [her separate] property to the marital estate." Dunn, 802 
P.2d at 1321. The real property was acquired after the marriage. R. at 48 f 21(a) and 56 
TJ1. There was also one child bom during the course of the parties' marriage. R. at 2 and 
i 
35. The real property was acquired after the birth of the parties' child. Tr. at 14-20. It 
follows that the house was purchased for the purpose of allowing both of the parties, and 
their minor child, to reside together and have a home together. 
It is also irrelevant that Respondent's name is not on the deed for the real property. 
This Court has "broad equitable power to distribute marital property, regardless of who 
holds title." Bradford, 1999 UT App. at 126; See also Finlavson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 
843, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) citing Hoagland v. Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) "Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have long held that once a 
court has determined something is marital property, the court may distribute it equitably, 
notwithstanding which party's name appears on the title.") The trial court should not 
have based its decision to award Petitioner the appreciation in the real property on this 
factor, especially when viewing other more compelling factors, such as Respondent's 
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financial contribution to the enhancement of the home and payment of the mortgage 
principal and interest. 
Finally, Petitioner failed to take the necessary steps to keep the property truly 
separate. Before the parties were married, Petitioner was aware of Respondent's meager 
financial situation, had a firm grasp of her assets and worth, access to legal services, but 
declined to have Respondent sign a prenuptial agreement. Tr. at 157: 3-25, 158: 1-25 and 
159: 1-17. While the prenuptial agreement would not have resolved the problems that are 
now present because of commingling, it could have shown some intent on the part of 
Petitioner to keep the assets separate. 
This Court should reverse the decision of the trial court regarding the real 
property. It was clearly against the applicable law because it failed to adequately address 
the contributions that Respondent made towards the enhancement of the property, and 
failed to consider that Petitioner contributed her separate property to the marriage in the 
form of the marital home. Respondent contributed to child care, tile work, and placed 
money into Petitioner's account, which went towards the improvement of the house. Tr. 
at 106: 3-8, 153: 23-25 and 154: 1-7, 100:3-18, 174: 15-19 and 203: 13-18. The trial 
court's decision to make the entire appreciation in the real property separate was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, which resulted in substantial and 
prejudicial error, and a serious inequity. See Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1146; (citing English, 
565 P.2d at 410; Eames, 735 P.2d at 397). Therefore, this Court should reverse the 
decision of the trial court and order the real property sold, all encumbrances and costs for 
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the sale paid first from the proceeds, then Petitioner's and Respondent's financial 
contributions, and the appreciation ultimately divided equally. 
2. THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENT THAT 
WOULD JUSTIFY AN UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
APPRECIATION IN THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING THE 
MARRIAGE. 
Since the appreciation in the real property acquired during the marriage should be 
considered marital it should be divided equally, since there are no exceptional 
circumstances that would justify an unequal division. In Utah, "[ejach party is presumed 
to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital 
property." Thomas, 987 P.2d at 610. An unequal distribution of marital property by a 
trial court "is only justified when the trial court 'memorialize^] in commendably detailed 
findings' the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." Bradford, 1999 UT 
App. at % 27); citing Thomas, 987 P.2d at 609. The only comment by the trial court that 
could be viewed as an exceptional circumstance finding is not supported by the record. 
Further, there are no exceptional circumstances present here that would justify an unequal 
distribution of the appreciation in the real property. 
a. THE ONLY FINDING BY THE COURT THAT WOULD JUSTIFY 
AN UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE APPRECIATION IN THE 
REAL PROPERTY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The trial court did not make an explicit finding regarding exceptional 
circumstances that would justify an unequal distribution in the appreciation in the real 
property in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or the Amended Findings of 
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Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. at 701-716 and 723-739. However, near the conclusion 
of proceedings, the trial court stated the following: 
I think the testimony, as I recall, that you're going to need future surgery 
and that that money needs to be kept, your assets need to be retained to the 
extent legally possible so that you have the money for those medical bills in 
the future and I've taken all of this into consideration in determining 
attorney's fees and the fact that each side will be paying their own and I've 
taken into account the history of thefhouse in determining that it's an asset 
to be awarded to the petitioner subject to one small payment to the 
respondent. 
Tr. at 217: 15-24. While this statement is a far cry from an "exceptional finding," more 
importantly, it is not supported by the record. Specifically, there is simply no evidence 
indicating how much these future surgeries will cost, or whether Petitioner's monthly 
annuity of more than $9,000.00 is adequate to pay for any needed surgeries. 
The Rules of Appellate Procedure state "[a] party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). Further, Respondent must "marshal all evidence in favor of the facts as found 
by the trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact." 
Peterson, 818 P.2d at 1308. 
The Marshaled Evidence in Support of the Finding:4 
Testimony of Linda Crandall 
4
 It should be noted that Respondent is not (disputing that Petitioner was burned as a child, 
that serious injuries resulted, and that she has had to have surgeries in the past. 
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MR. RICHMAN: Just to give the Court a sample of the things that she 
needs and may need in the future as planned surgery? 
MS. CRANDALL: She plans to have tissue expanders put in so that the 
scars on her neck can be released, so the skin will over about a two or three 
months period, the tissue expanders will be expanded so that makes her skin grow 
so that she'll have more skin to bring up here so that her mouth and neck is not 
being pulled down so much. She has to have one side of her nose and her upper 
lip redone. She has more things to be done on her mouth. She has things that 
i 
need to be done on her legs and it's just ongoing. The scars never stop (inaudible) 
out. It'll go on for the rest of her life. 
Tr. at 31: 7-18. 
Testimony of Petitioner 
MR. RICHMAN: And do you have significant ongoing medical expenses? 
PETITIONER: Yes, lifelong. 
MR. RICHMAN: You have had more than one surgery. Would you tell 
me how may [sic] surgeries you've had? 
PETITIONER: We don't know, about 80. 
MR. RICHMAN: And do you have any more planned? 
PETITIONER: Yes. 
Tr. at 151: 22-25 and 152: 1-4. 
PETITIONER: The skin is (inaudible). 
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THE COURT: So you need to have all of that surgically handled? 
PETITONER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And we/re talking about a number of different surgeries? 
PETITIONER: Yes. 
Tr. at 169: 1-7. 
Absent from any of this is a discussion regarding how much surgeries will cost. 
Further, there was testimony from Petitioner, and her mother, that Petitioner had not had 
a surgery in approximately nine years. Tr. 31:7-18 and 167: 8-11. Without evidence on 
the record regarding the cost, the trial court's statement that "I think the testimony, as I 
recall, that you're going to need future surgery and that that money needs to be kept, your 
assets need to be retained to the extent legally possible so that you have the money for 
those medical bills in the future" was not adequately supported by the record. Tr. at 217: 
12-24. 
b. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING AN 
UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE APPRECIATION IN THE 
REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING THE MARRIAGE 
WERE NOT FOUND. 
As was stated above, in Utah, "[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled to all of his 
or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Thomas, 987 P.2d at 
610. Further, an unequal distribution of marital property by a trial court "is only justified 
when the trial court 'memorialize^] in commendably detailed findings' the exceptional 
circumstances supporting the distribution." Bradford, 1999 UT App. at % 27; (citing 
Thomas, 987 P.2d at 609.) It follows that if Petitioner felt that an unequal division of 
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property was justified, that Petitioner should have the burden of showing that exceptional 
circumstances exist that would justify such a decision by the trial court. However, the 
record evidence in this matter does nqt show that there are any circumstances justifying 
an unequal distribution of the appreciation in the real property acquired during the 
marriage. Even if this Court feels that Petitioner's condition may justify a finding of 
exceptional circumstances, the case must be remanded since the trial court's findings are 
absent of any eevidence regarding the cost of surgeries, and whether the cost of any 
surgeries requires an unequal distribution of the appreciation in the real property. 
First, it is important to note that Respondent is not attempting to take any action 
that would reduce the corpus of Petitioner's settlement. Respondent is simply requesting 
that he be awarded an equal share in only the appreciation of the marital home. The real 
property should be ordered to be sold, and the proceeds should be divided as follows. 
Any encumbrances, including the mortgage and costs for the sale, should be paid first 
from the proceeds. Then Petitioner and Respondent would be paid their financial 
contributions. Specifically, Petitioner should be reimbursed for the full amount she paid 
as a down payment for the house and Respondent should be reimbursed for the amount of 
his personal injury settlement that was placed in Petitioner's account. Since Respondent 
has already received $14,000.00 of that amount, he would only be owed the remaining 
portion of the $24,682.35. After that, the remaining appreciation should be divided 
equally. The corpus of Petitioner's personal injury settlement would not be reduced by 
the division. Petitioner would receive back what she invested from her personal injury 
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settlement as well as the increase to her investment, in the form of her half of the 
appreciation. However, Respondent would also receive an equitable portion of the 
appreciation from hisettorts to enhance the property and contribute to the marriage. 
Second, while the record is lacking in evidence regarding the cost of any future 
surgeries, it does indicate that Petitioner has not had a surgery for a substantial period of 
time. Specifically, Petitioner has not had a surgery in approximately nine years. Tr. at 
167: 8-11. Further, Petitioner receives $9,305.00 per month, tax free, from her personal 
injury settlements. Tr. at 158: 9-16. Also, at the time the real property was purchased, 
Petitioner had one million dollars in a structured trust fund. Tr. at 158: 17-23. In 
addition, after the parties' separation, Petitioner acquired another home, which was 
purchased, in cash, for $168,000.00. Tr. at 166: 24-25 and 167: 1-3. Petitioner is able to 
still make payments on the real property that was acquired during the marriage. Tr. at 
166: 5-7. Finally, as was discussed above, the record is void of any evidence regarding 
Petitioner's future cost for surgeries. Without this information, the trial court's statement 
that Petitioner is "going to need future surgery and that that money needs to be kept, your 
assets need to be retained to the extent legally possible so that you have the money for 
those medical bills in the future" lacks support from the record. Tr. at 217: 16-19. There 
is simply no basis to state that there are exceptional circumstances justifying an unequal 
distribution of the appreciation in the real property. 
Finally, Petitioner failed to take the necessary steps to keep the property truly 
separate. Before the parties were married, Petitioner was aware of Respondent's meager 
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financial situation, had a firm grasp of her assets and worth, access to legal services, but 
declined to have Respondent sign a prenuptial agreement. Tr. at 157: 3-25, 158: 1-25 and 
159: 1-17. While the prenuptial agreement would not have resolved the problems that are 
now present because of commingling, it could have shown some intent on the part of 
Petitioner to keep the assets separate. If she was truly in need of the money for future, 
necessary, surgeries, it would have made sense to have Respondent sign a prenuptial 
agreement. 
Therefore, because the trial court failed to "cmemorialize[s] in commendably detailed 
findings' the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution" any exceptional 
circumstances that would justify an unequal distribution of the appreciation in the real 
property this Court should find that the appreciation should be divided equally. Even if 
this Court feels that Petitioner's condition could be an exceptional circumstance, this case 
must be remanded since there is no record evidence indicating how much future surgeries 
would cost. Without evidence in regard to that issue, it is not possible to know whether 
or not failing to divide the appreciation in the house equally would prevent Petitioner 
from being able to afford future surgeries and a remand is required. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER THAT RESPONDENT SHOULD 
REIMBURSE PETITIONER FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES PAID IN 
RESPONDENT'S BEHALF, WHEN THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT TO 
THAT EFFECT, AMD INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS TO WHEN THE 
SURGERY OCCURRED AND WHEN THE SURGERY COSTS WERE 
PAID BY PETITIONER, REQUIRES THAT THIS CASE BE REMANDED 
TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
In the alternative, if this Court determines that the appreciation in the real property 
is not marital property, this case must be remanded to determine if Respondent should be 
reimbursed in full for the personal injury settlement funds that were deposited in 
Petitioner's personal bank account. Respondent was injured in a car accident prior to the 
parties' marriage. Tr. at 96: 21-22. Petitioner paid for some of the medical expenses 
incurred from Respondent's injuries out of her own personal funds; in particular, a 
surgery on Appellant's back. Tr. at 96: 17-22. There was no agreement that Respondent 
would reimburse Petitioner for her payment of these medical expenses. Tr. at 97: 12-18. 
Respondent received a settlement from his personal injuries that included an annuity in 
the amount of at least $24,635.37. Tr. at 106: 3-8. That amount went into Petitioner's 
personal account, to which Respondent did not have access. Tr. at 106: 3-13. The trial 
court found that: 
[d]uring the marriage of the parties Respondent received a personal injury 
settlement of approximately $24,000.00 which was deposited into 
Petitioner's individual checking account. Petitioner paid approximately 
$10,000.00 for Respondent's medical bills for injuries received in the 
incident giving rise to the personal injury settlement. Petitioner should 
reimburse Respondent the sum of $14,000.00. 
R. at 705 and 727-728. The Conclusions of Law and Amended Conclusions of Law 
stated the same. R. at 712-713 and 735. Again, a trial court's property division will be 
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modified when "there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, 
or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." 
Naranio, 751 P.2d at 1146; (citing English, 565 P.2d at 410; Eames, 735 P.2d at 397.) In 
regard to this issue, the trial court's finding and subsequent order satisfies the above 
standard and a remand is necessary. 
Respondent does not dispute the facts that the trial court based its finding and 
decision on. Rather, Respondent argues that the trial court's decision was based on 
inadequate facts regarding when the surgery occurred and the bill paid for. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has stated "[b]ecause of the personal nature of special damages, 
amounts received as compensation for pain, suffering, disfigurement, disability, or other 
personal debilitation are generally found to be the personal property of the injured spouse 
in divorce actions." Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1148. Further, "money realized as 
compensation for lost wages and medical expenses, which diminish the marital estate, are 
considered to be marital property." Id. It is not clear from the record whether the surgery 
took place before or after the marriage, and as a result, it is not clear when the bill was 
paid. Petitioner testified as follows: 
PETITIONER: We were rear-ended in Arizona on the way back from my 
grandparents and a car rear-ended us. He go some vertebrae that were, Fm not 
sure what happened to them but he had to go and have bone cartilage from a 
cadaver put into his neck. 
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MR. RICHMAN: And when did the surgery take place? 
PETITIONER: October. 
MR. RICHMAN: Of what year? 
PETITIONER: '02. 
MR. RICHMAN: Prior to marriage? 
PETITIONER: Yes, wait no. The surgery I believe was after the marriage 
but the injury was before the marriage. 
Tr. at 152: 20-25 and 153: 1-6. If "money realized as compensation for lost wages and 
medical expenses, which diminish the marital estate, are considered to be marital 
property," then the date of the surgery, and subsequently when the bill was paid, is vital 
to making that determination. Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1148. The trial court's 
determination, based on the record evidence and the law cited above, is incorrect, and this 
Court must remand this case so that a determination based upon adequate evidence can 
occur. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court be 
reversed, or in the alternative that the case be remanded so that adequate findings can be 
made in regard to the cost of future surgeries for Petitioner, whether Petitioner can pay 
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for those surgeries from her oersonal iniury settlement, and/or the exact date of 
Respondent's surgery and when that gurgery was paid for. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this. day of April 2007. 
SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
/ARKEI 
5CHOFIELD 
JEFFREY A. CALLISTER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
39 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this £ { day Of April, 2007,1 deposited in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, and'hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to: 
Glen M. Richman, Esq. 
Barbara W. Richman, Esq. 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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ADDENDUM "A 
Glen M. Richman (#2752) 
Barbara W. Richman (#1707) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
.60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAMILLE CASTILLO-JOHNSON, 
I Petitioner, 1 
vs. 
TRAVIS PAUL JOHNSON, 
| Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 044907342 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis | 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
This matter having been tried before the Court, the Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis, on 
May 3, May 9, 2006, and July 6, 2006, and the parties having entered into certain stipulations 
pertaining to facts and issues herein, and having provided testimony and presented documentary 
evidence, and other witnesses for each of the parties having been called and having given 
testimony in support of the respective causes of Petitioner and Respondent, and the Court having 
considered the stipulations of the parties, and the testimony and evidence presented by each 
party, and being fully advised in the premises, and after hearing arguments of counsel, now 
makes and enters the following: 
S£P f 2 2006 
°eputy ClerJ 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A Decree of Divorce was entered herein on the 25th day of April, 2005, terminating 
the marriage of the parties but reserving all remaining issues for resolution by subsequent Order. 
All remaining issues are hereby resolved. 
2. CUSTODY: The parties have one (1) child bom as issue of the marriage, 
GABRIEL JOHNSON, bom January 1, 2003. Petitioner has had the temporary sole legal and 
physical custody of said minor child during the pendency of this action. Petitioner is a fit and 
proper person to be awarded the permanent sole legal and physical custody of said minor child. 
3. PARENT-TIME: Respondent's parent-time with the minor child has been governed 
by a Protective Order issued on April 21, 2005 in Case No. 054901214, and provides for 
supervised visits by WillWin. The Office of Guardian ad Litem should be appointed in this case. 
Respondent's parent-time with the child should be under the following conditions: Respondent 
is to undergo a five panel drug test at his sole cost and expense prior to each visitation with the 
child. A reduction of drug tests may occur only after a significant period of time has passed and 
the Guardian ad Litem has approved a reduction. The Court would then consider and a written 
Order must follow for the reduction. Until that time drug tests are to occur prior to every 
visitation and the drug test results are to be provided to Petitioner, to Pamela G. Johnson the 
parent-time supervisor, and to the Court. If the drug test is positive then the visitation is not to 
occur. Pamela G. Johnson is to supervise the visitation and remain present during the entire 
visitation. Her other son that has a drug problem is not to be present during visits. Visitation 
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will be every other Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. On the weekend a visitation does not 
occur, a visitation will occur on Monday from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. The first weeknight 
'Visitation will begin on Monday, May 15, 2006. There are to be no overnight visitations at this 
time. Respondent is to attend three (3) AA meetings per week and provide proof to the court. 
Neither Petitioner nor Respondent is to use alcohol or drugs 48 hours prior to being with the 
child, unless the medications are prescribed. 
4. INCOME: Petitioner receives monthly annuity payments as a result of a 
structured settlement arising from injuries she received as a young child, and income from 
investment accounts and certain assets invested in an irrevocable trust resulting in average gross 
monthly income of $8,977.00. Respondent receives a monthly annuity payment of $425.00 from 
settlement of a personal injury claim. Respondent has been voluntarily unemployed but 
represented that he had been hired full time at Convergys beginning May 15, 2006 and will earn 
$9.15 per hour for monthly income of $1,586.00. Respondent's gross monthly income is 
$2,011.00. 
5. CHILD SUPPORT: The base child support calculation using each party's 
respective gross income and Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15 is set forth in the Child Support 
Worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit A, and Respondent is required to pay to Petitioner the sum 
of $149.00 per month as and for child support for the one (1) minor child of the parties until such 
time as said child attains age 18 and finishes high school in the normal year of graduation. The 
payment schedule provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.5 should be applicable; the abatement 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.11 should be applicable; the delinquency consequences 
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of Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-4 and -5 should be applicable, and the adjustment provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.10 should be applicable. 
6. DELINQUENT CHILD SUPPORT: Respondent has paid no child support since 
the entry of the Temporary Order on April 26, 2005 and therefore is delinquent in child support 
payments at the rate of $149.00 per month for the period of time commencing with April, 2005 
through July, 2006, or 16 months, for a total delinquency of $2,384.00. 
7. CHILD CARE EXPENSES: Pursuant to the Temporary Order entered April 27, 
2005 each of the parties was ordered to be responsible for one half of the preschool (day care ) 
charges incurred on behalf of the minor child. Since entry of the Temporary Order and through 
April 27, 2006 a total of $7,677.85 was incurred for the minor child's pre-school expenses. 
Respondent has failed to pay one-half of the charges which totals $3,838.92. In accordance with 
the provisions and procedures of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16 each party should pay one-half of 
all day care and child care expenses incurred from and after April 27, 2006 for the benefit of the 
parties' minor child. 
8. MEDICAL EXPENSES: Pursuant to the Temporary Order entered April 27, 
2005 each of the parties was ordered to be responsible for one half of the hospital, dental and 
medical care expenses incurred for the minor child. Through December 14, 2005 a total of 
$2,049.62 in medical expenses was incurred for the minor child. Respondent has failed to pay 
one-half of the charges which totals $1,024.81. In accordance with the provisions and 
procedures of Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7-15, each party shall assume and pay one-half of any and 
all premiums, hospital, medical, deductibles, and dental expenses which may be incurred from 
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and after December 14, 2005 by or on behalf of the minor child during his minority, and which 
are not otherwise paid by insurance, promptly upon presentation of the billing to the other. 
9. INCOME TAX EXEMPTION: Petitioner should be allowed to claim the 
minor child as her tax dependent for each tax year beginning with 2005 and thereafter. 
10. ALIMONY: Each party is self supporting or capable of self support and neither 
has a need for alimony from the other. No alimony should be awarded to either party from the 
other. 
11. REAL PROPERTY: The real property situated at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, 
Draper, Utah, 84020 was purchased by Petitioner from her separate, pre-marital funds and assets. 
Title to said real property was taken by Petitioner individually. Respondent was never included 
or named as an owner on the title to said real property. Petitioner was the sole applicant of and 
obligor on the obligation which encumbers the real property. All payments of the mortgage 
principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. All payments of the real 
property taxes and insurance were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. 
12. RESPONDENTS PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT: During the marriage 
of the parties Respondent received a personal injury settlement of approximately $24,000.00 
which was deposited into Petitioner's individual checking account. Petitioner paid 
approximately $10,000.00 for Respondent's medical bills for injuries received in the incident 
giving rise to the personal injury settlement. Petitioner should reimburse Respondent the sum of 
$14,000.00. 
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13. VEHICLES: 
A. 2003 Saab. During the marriage the parties jointly purchased a 2003 
S^ aab vehicle. The purchase of the vehicle was jointly financed by the parties through WFS 
Financial. Paragraph 5 of the Temporary Order entered April 27, 2005 provided: 
5. Respondent shall have the use of the Saab vehicle 
subject to keeping the payments made in a timely manner 
and holding Petitioner harmless from liability thereon. In 
the event Respondent is delinquent on any payment on the 
financing of the Saab automobile the possession shall 
immediately revert to the Petitioner as her sole and separate 
property and she may take possession of the same with or 
without the assistance of an officer of the law and dispose 
of the vehicle as she wishes. 
As stated in the Affidavit of Petitioner filed June 17, 2005 Respondent failed to remain current in 
the payment on the Saab. Petitioner took possession of the Saab and was required to pay for 
repairs totaling $179.59 to make the vehicle drivable. Additional needed repairs are estimated at 
$796.59. The vehicle was in considerable disrepair when Petitioner took possession which has 
devalued it from the current average retail NADA value of $18,200 to $10,500. The balance 
owing on the obligation in favor of WTS Financial as of April 12, 2006 is $19,962.60. In 
accordance with the Temporary Order entered April 27, 2005, the 2003 Saab is Petitioner's 
separate property and not marital property. 
B. Chevrolet Prism. During the marriage Petitioner purchased a Chevrolet 
Prism vehicle which is physically located in the state of Alaska. Respondent should be awarded 
the Chevrolet Prism and Petitioner should deliver clear title to him. Respondent is to obtain 
possession of the Chevrolet Prism in the state of Alaska at his sole cost and expense. 
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C. 2002 Hyundai. Prior to the marriage of the parties Petitioner owned a 2002 
Hyundai Santa Fe vehicle which she purchased with her separate funds and assets. Petitioner 
hplds title to said vehicle in her own name. Respondent did not provide funds to purchase the 
vehicle and has never been included on the title to said vehicle. The Hyundai is Petitioner's 
separate property and not marital property. 
14. PERSONAL MARITAL PROPERTY: Each of the parties owned personal 
property prior to their marriage. Each party has possession of his or her separate personal 
property which each owned prior to the marriage. Each party should be awarded those items of 
marital property which each has in his or her respective possession as of the date of trial. With 
respect to marital property which has been sold or otherwise disposed of, Petitioner should pay 
Respondent $4,000 for the dining table, $2,500 for the living room furniture, $3,000 for the 
bedroom set, and $100 for the punching bag for a total of $9,600.00. The money is to be paid 
within 30 days from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
15. DEBTS: Each party should assume and pay all debts and obligations in his or her 
separate name, whether incurred before, during or after the marriage, and should hold the other 
harmless for liability thereon. Petitioner should assume atid pay the obligation on the 2003 Saab. 
16. MUTUAL PROTECTIVE ORDER: A permanent protective order should remain 
in place as to both parties, with each party being permanently restrained from attempting, 
committing, or threatening to commit domestic violence or abuse against the other, and each 
shall not stalk, harass, or threaten, or use or attempt to use physical force that would reasonably 
be expected to cause physical injury to the other. Each party should be permanently restrained 
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from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, e-mailing or otherwise 
communicating with the other. Each party should be permanently ordered to stay away from the 
other's residence and premises, and stay away from the school, place of employment and/or 
other places and their premises, frequented by the other party. 
17. NAME CHANGE: Defendant's Counter Petition for Divorce at paragraph 27 
suggested that Plaintiff be restored to her birth name of "CASTILLO" and Petitioner's Answer 
to the Counter Petition agreed. 
18. DOCUMENTATION: Within ten (10) days from the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce and, from time to time as circumstances may require, each party shall execute and 
deliver to the other any and all documents that are required to accomplish and implement the 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce^ including deeds, titles and any and all other documents. 
19. FUNDS EXCHANGE DATE: The judgments against Respondent for delinquent 
child support of $2,384.00; child care expenses of $3,838.92, and medical expenses of 
$1,024.81, for a total of $7,247.73 should be offset against the $9,600.00 to be paid by Petitioner 
to Respondent for his share of the marital property. The remaining balance of $2,352.27, along 
with the $14,000.00 reimbursement of Respondent 's personal injury settlement funds shall be 
paid by Petitioner to Respondent within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. 
20. ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS: Petitioner has incurred a total of $40,923.03 
in attorney fees and costs in this action as shown on an Affidavit filed by Petitioner's attorneys. 
Respondent's attorneys filed an Affidavit on July 6, 2006 which fails to itemize the services 
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performed, the time expended, and the charges for each item. Petitioner is the prevailing party 
on the disputed issues of child custody and the ownership and appreciation of the real property. 
Petitioner has sufficient assets and ability to pay her own attorney fees. Respondent does not 
have the ability to pay Petitioner's attorney fees. Each party should pay his or her own attorney 
fees and costs incurred herein. 
Having reviewed the file and record in this matter, having made and entered the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, and having been fully informed in the premises, the Court hereby 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
21. CUSTODY: Petitioner should be awarded the permanent sole legal and physical 
custody of the one (1) child bom as issue of the marriage, GABRIEL JOHNSON, bom January 
1,2003. 
22. PARENT-TIME: Respondent's parent-time with the child should be under the 
guidance of The Office of Guardian ad Litem which has been appointed in this case and should 
take place under the following conditions: Respondent is to undergo a five panel drug test at his 
sole cost and expense prior to each visitation with the child. A reduction of drug tests may occur 
only after a significant period of time has passed and the Guardian ad Litem has approved a 
reduction. The Court would then consider and a written Order must follow for the reduction. 
Until that time drug tests are to occur prior to every visitation and the drug test results are to be 
provided to Petitioner, to Pamela G. Johnson the parent-time supervisor, and to the Court. If the 
drug test is positive then the visitation is not to occur. Pamela G. Johnson is to supervise the 
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visitation and remain present during the entire visitation. Her other son that has a drug problem 
is not to be present during visits. Visitation will be every other Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 
* p.m. On the weekend a visitation does not occur, a visitation will occur on Monday from 4:00 
p.m. to 7:00 p.m. The first weeknight visitation will begin on Monday, May 15, 2006. There are 
to be no overnight visitations at this time. Respondent is to attend three (3) AA meetings per 
week and provide proof to the court. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent is to use alcohol or 
drugs 48 hours prior to being with the child, unless the medications are prescribed. 
23. INCOME: Petitioner's gross monthly income is $8,977.00. Respondent's 
gross monthly income is $2,011.00. 
24. CHILD SUPPORT: The base child support calculation using each party's 
respective gross income and Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15 is set forth in the Child Support 
Worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit A, and Respondent is required to pay to Petitioner the sum 
of $149.00 per month as and for child support for the one (1) minor child of the parties until such 
time as said child attains age 18 and finishes high school in the normal year of graduation. The 
payment schedule provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.5 should be applicable; the abatement 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.11 should be applicable; the delinquency consequences 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-4 and -5 should be applicable, and the adjustment provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.10 should be applicable. 
25. DELINQUENT CHILD SUPPORT: Respondent has paid no child support since 
the entry of the Temporary Order on April 26, 2005 and therefore is delinquent in child support 
payments at the rate of $149.00 per month for the period of time commencing with April, 2005 
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through July, 2006, or 16 months, for a total delinquency of $2,384.00. The delinquent child 
support owed by Respondent should be offset against sums payable by Petitioner to Respondent. 
26. CHILD CARE EXPENSES: Pursuant to the Temporary Order entered April 27, 
2005 each of the parties was ordered to be responsible for one half of the preschool (day care ) 
charges incurred on behalf of the minor child. Since entry of the Temporary Order and through 
April 27, 2006 a total of $7,677.85 was incurred for the minor child's pre-school expenses. 
Respondent has failed to pay one-half of the charges which totals $3,838.92. The delinquent 
child care/preschool expenses owed by Respondent should be offset against sums payable by 
Petitioner to Respondent. In accordance with the provisions and procedures of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.16 each party should pay one-half of all day care and child care expenses incurred 
from and after April 27, 2006 for the benefit of the parties' minor child. 
27. MEDICAL EXPENSES: Pursuant to the Temporary Order entered April 27, 
2005 each of the parties was ordered to be responsible for one half of the hospital, dental and 
medical care expenses incurred for the minor child. Through December 14, 2005 a total of 
$2,049.62 in medical expenses was incurred for the minor child. Respondent has failed to pay 
one~half of the charges which totals $1,024.81. The delinquent medical expenses owed by 
Respondent should be offset against sums payable by Petitioner to Respondent. In accordance 
with the provisions and procedures of Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7-15, each party shall assume and 
pay one-half of any and all premiums, hospital, medical, deductibles, and dental expenses which 
may be incurred from and after December 14, 2005 by or on behalf of the minor child during his 
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minority, and which are not otherwise paid by insurance, promptly upon presentation of the 
billing to the other. 
28. INCOME TAX EXEMPTION: Petitioner should be allowed to claim the 
minor child as her tax dependent beginning with tax year 2005 and thereafter. 
29. ALIMONY: Each party is self supporting or capable of self support and neither 
has a need for alimony from the other. No alimony should be awarded to either party from the 
other. 
30. REAL PROPERTY: The real property situated at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, 
Draper, Utah, 84020 was purchased by Petitioner from her separate, pre-marital funds and assets. 
Title to said real property was taken by Petitioner individually. Respondent was never included 
or named as an owner on the title to said real property. Petitioner was the sole applicant of and 
obligor on the obligation which encumbers the real property. All payments of the mortgage 
principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. All payments of the real 
property taxes and insurance were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. The real property 
situated at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, Draper, Utah, 84020 is and always has been 
Petitioner's separate property and all appreciation in value of said real property is Petitioner's 
separate property. 
31. RESPONDENTS PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT: During the marriage 
of the parties Respondent received a personal injury settlement of approximately $24,000.00 
which was deposited into Petitioner's individual checking account. Petitioner paid 
approximately $10,000.00 for Respondent's medical bills for injuries received in the incident 
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giving rise to the personal injury settlement. Petitioner should reimburse Respondent the sum of 
$14,000.00. 
32. VEHICLES: 
A. 2003 Saab. During the marriage the parties jointly purchased a 2003 
Saab vehicle. The purchase of the vehicle was jointly financed by the parties through WFS 
Financial. Paragraph 5 of the Temporary Order entered April 27, 2005 provided: 
5. Respondent shall have the use of the Saab vehicle 
subject to keeping the payments made in a timely manner 
and holding Petitioner harmless from liability thereon. In 
the event Respondent is delinquent on any payment on the 
financing of the Saab automobile the possession shall 
immediately revert to the Petitioner as her sole and separate 
property and she may take possession of the same with or 
without the assistance of an officer of the law and dispose 
of the vehicle as she wishes. 
As stated in the Affidavit of Petitioner filed June 17, 2005 Respondent failed to remain current in 
the payment on the Saab. Petitioner took possession of the Saab and was required to pay for 
repairs totaling $179.59 to make the vehicle drivable. Additional needed repairs are estimated at 
$796.59. The vehicle was in considerable disrepair when Petitioner took possession which has 
devalued it from the current average retail NAD A value of $18,200 to $10,500. The balance 
owing on the obligation in favor of WTS Financial as of April 12, 2006 is $19,962.60. In 
accordance with the Temporary Order entered April 27, 2005, the 2003 Saab is Petitioner's 
separate property and not marital property. 
B. Chevrolet Prism. During the marriage Petitioner purchased a Chevrolet 
Prism vehicle which is physically located in the state of Alaska. Respondent should be awarded 
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the Chevrolet Prism and Petitioner should deliver clear title to him. Respondent is to obtain 
possession of the Chevrolet Prism in the state of Alaska at his sole cost and expense. 
C. 2002 Hyundai: Prior to the marriage of the parties Petitioner owned a 2002 
Hyundai Santa Fe vehicle which she purchased with her separate funds and assets. Petitioner 
holds title to said vehicle in her own name. Respondent did not provide funds to purchase the 
vehicle and has never been included on the title to said vehicle. The Hyundai is Petitioner's 
separate property and not marital property. 
33. PERSONAL MARITAL PROPERTY: Each of the parties owned personal 
property prior to their marriage. Each party has possession of his or her separate personal 
property which each owned prior to the marriage. Each party should be awarded those items of 
marital property which each has in his or her respective possession as of the date of trial. With 
respect to marital property which has been sold or otherwise disposed of, Petitioner should pay 
Respondent $4,000 for the dining table, $2,500 for the living room furniture, $3,000 for the 
bedroom set, and $100 for the punching bag for a total of $9,600.00. 
34. DEBTS: Each party should assume and pay all debts and obligations in his or her 
separate name, whether incurred before, during or after the marriage, and should hold the other 
harmless for liability thereon. Petitioner should assume and pay the obligation on the 2003 Saab. 
35. MUTUAL PROTECTIVE ORDER: A permanent protective order should remain 
in place as to both parties, with each party being permanently restrained from attempting, 
committing, or threatening to commit domestic violence or abuse against the other, and each 
shall not stalk, harass, or threaten, or use or attempt to use physical force that would reasonably 
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be expected to cause physical injury to the other. Each party should be permanently restrained 
from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, e-mailing or otherwise 
xommunicating with the other. Each party should be permanently ordered to stay away from the 
other's residence and premises, and stay away from the school, place of employment and/or 
other places and their premises, frequented by the other party. 
36. NAME CHANGE: Petitioner should be restored to her birth name of 
"CASTILLO". 
37. DOCUMENTATION: Within ten (10) days from the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, and from time to time as the circumstances may require, each party shall execute and 
deliver to the other any and all documents that are required to accomplish and implement the 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce, including deeds, titles and any and all other documents. 
38. FUNDS EXCHANGE DATE: The delinquent child support, unpaid child care and 
day care expenses, and medical expenses owed by Respondent to Petitioner as set forth herein 
which total $7,247.73 shall be offset against the $9,600.00 payable by Petitioner to Respondent, 
leaving a balance payable by Petitioner to Respondent of $2,352.27 which is to be paid to 
Respondent within 30 days from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce along with the 
$14,000.00 reimbursement by Petitioner to Respondent from his personal injury settlement 
funds. 
39. ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS: Petitioner has incurred a total of $40,923.03 
in attorney fees and costs in this action as shown on an Affidavit filed by Petitioner's attorneys. 
Respondent's attorneys filed an Affidavit on July 6, 2006 which fails to itemize the services 
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performed, the time expended, and the charges for each item. Petitioner was the prevailing party 
on all disputed issues including child custody and the ownership and appreciation of the real 
, property. Petitioner has sufficient assets and ability to pay her own attorney fees. Respondent 
does not have the ability to pay Petitioner's attorney fees. Each party should pay his or her 
separate attorney fees and costs incurred in this action. 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY this _ _ ^ f 3ay of 
, 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SMART SCHOFIELD SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
BRADLEY J. SCHOFIELD 
Attorneys for Defendant 
VOX 
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Glen M. Richman (#2752) 
Barbara W. Richman (#1707) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
' S/alt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
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TRAVIS PAUL JOHNSON, 
|| Respondent. 
DECREE AND JUDGMENT RESOLVING 
ALL ISSUES AND PERMANENT 
MUTUAL PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Case No. 044907342 
II 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
This matter having been tried before the Court, the Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis, on 
May 3, May 9, 2006, and July 6, 2006, and the parties having entered into certain stipulations 
pertaining to facts and issues herein, and having provided testimony and presented documentary 
evidence, and other witnesses for each of the parties having been called and having given 
testimony in support of the respective causes of Petitioner and Respondent, and the Court having 
considered the stipulations of the parties, and the testimony and evidence presented by each 
party, and being fully advised in the premises, and after hearing arguments of counsel, and the 
Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and 
enters the following: 
Signed on 8/26/06, Decree and, i A! 
JD20593237 
DECREE AND JUDGMENT RESOLVING ALL ISSUES 
1. A Decree of Divorce was entered herein on the 25th day of April, 2005, terminating 
the marriage of the parties but reserving all remaining issues for resolution by subsequent Order. 
All remaining issues are hereby decreed and adjudged herein. 
2. CUSTODY: Petitioner is hereby awarded the permanent sole legal and physical 
custody of the one (1) child bom as issue of the marriage, GABRIEL JOHNSON, bom January 
1,2003. 
3. PARENT-TIME: Respondent's parent-time with the child is hereby ordered to be 
under the guidance of the Office of Guardian ad Litem which has been appointed in this case and 
is hereby ordered to take place under the following conditions: Respondent is to undergo a five 
panel drug test at his sole cost and expense prior to each visitation with the child. A reduction of 
drug tests may occur only after a significant period of time has passed and the Guardian ad Litem 
has approved a reduction. The Court would then consider and a written Order must follow for 
the reduction. Until that time drug tests are to occur prior to every visitation and the drug test 
results are to be provided to Petitioner, to Pamela G. Johnson the parent-time supervisor, and to 
the Court. If the drug test is positive then the visitation is not to occur. Pamela G. Johnson is to 
supervise the visitation and remain present during the entire visitation. Her other son that has a 
drug problem is not to be present during visits. Visitation will be every other Saturday from 8:00 
a.m. to 1:00 p.m. On the weekend a visitation does not occur, a visitation will occur on Monday 
from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. The first weeknight visitation will begin on Monday, May 15, 2006. 
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There are to be no overnight visitations at this time. Respondent is to attend three (3) AA 
meetings per week and provide proof to the court. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent is to use 
alcohol or drugs 48 hours prior to being with the child, unless the medications are prescribed. 
4. INCOME: Petitioner's gross monthly income is $8,977.00. Respondent's 
gross monthly income is $2,011.00. 
5. CHILD SUPPORT: The base child support calculation using each party's 
respective gross income and Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15 is set forth in the Child Support 
Worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit A, and Respondent is hereby ordered to pay to Petitioner 
the sum of $149.00 per month as and for child support for the one (1) minor child of the parties 
until such time as said child attains age 18 and finishes high school in the normal year of 
graduation. The payment schedule provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.5 are hereby ordered 
applicable; the abatement provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.11 are hereby ordered 
applicable; the delinquency consequences of Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-4 and -5 are hereby 
ordered applicable, and the adjustment provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.10 are hereby 
ordered applicable. 
6. CHILD CARE EXPENSES: hi accordance with the provisions and procedures of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16 each party should pay one-half of all day care and child care 
expenses incurred from and after April 27, 2006 for the benefit of the parties' minor child. 
7. MEDICAL EXPENSES: In accordance with the provisions and procedures of 
Utah Code Aim. §78-45-7-15, each party shall assume and pay one-half of any and all premiums, 
hospital, medical, deductibles, and dental expenses which may be incurred from and after 
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December 14, 2005 by or on behalf of the minor child during his minority, and which are not 
otherwise paid by insurance, promptly upon presentation of the billing to the other. 
8. DELINQUENT CHILD SUPPORT; PRESCHOOL/DAYCARE EXPENSES; 
I 
and MEDICAL EXPENSES, AND ORDER OF OFFSET: Petitioner is hereby awarded 
judgment against Respondent for delinquent child support payments at the rate of $149.00 per 
month for the period of time commencing with April, 2005 through July, 2006, or 16 months, for 
a total judgment of $2,384.00. Petitioner is hereby awarded judgment against Respondent for 
one half of the preschool (day care) charges incurred on behalf of Ihe minor child since entry of 
the Temporary Order and through April 27, 2006 which total $7,677.85, one-half of which totals 
$3,838.92. Petitioner is hereby awarded judgment against Respondent for one half of the 
hospital, dental and medical care expenses incurred for the minor child since entry of the 
Temporary Order and through December 14, 2005 which total $2,049.62, one-half of which 
totals $1,024.81. The total delinquency of $7,247.73 is hereby ordered offset against sums 
payable by Petitioner to Respondent and set forth herein. 
9. INCOME TAX EXEMPTION: Petitioner is hereby awarded the right to 
claim the minor child as her tax dependent beginning with tax year 2005 and thereafter. 
10. ALIMONY: No alimony is awarded to either party from the other and alimony 
is ordered forever waived. 
11. REAL PROPERTY: The real property situated at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, 
Draper, Utah, 84020 is hereby ordered Petitioner's separate property and all appreciation in 
value of said real property is hereby ordered Petitioner's separate property. 
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12. RESPONDENTS PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT: Petitioner is hereby 
ordered to reimburse Respondent the sum of $14,000.00 of Respondent's personal injury 
settlement received during the marriage of the parties. 
13. VEHICLES: 
A. 2003 Saab. In accordance with the Temporary Order entered April 27, 
2005, the 2003 Saab is Petitioner's separate property and not marital property and the 2003 Saab 
is awarded to Petitioner subject to the encumbrance thereon. 
B. Chevrolet Prism. Respondent is hereby awarded the Chevrolet Prism and 
Petitioner is hereby ordered to deliver clear title to him. Respondent is hereby ordered to obtain 
possession of the Chevrolet Prism in the state of Alaska at his sole cost and expense. 
C. 2002 Hyundai: The 2002 Hyundai Santa Fe vehicle is hereby ordered 
Petitioner's separate property and not marital property and the 2002 Hyundai Santa Fe vehicle 
which is free of encumbrance is awarded to Petitioner. 
14. PERSONAL MARITAL PROPERTY: Each party is hereby awarded the 
items of personal property which each owned prior to the marriage and which are in his or her 
respective possession as of the date of trial. Each party is hereby awarded those items of marital 
property which each has in his or her respective possession as of the date of trial. With respect to 
marital property which has been sold or otherwise disposed of, Petitioner is hereby ordered to 
pay Respondent $4,000 for the dining table, $2,500 for the living room furniture, $3,000 for the 
bedroom set, and $100 for the punching bag for a total of $9,600.00. 
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15. DEBTS: Each party is hereby ordered to assume and pay all debts and obligations 
in his or her separate name, whether incurred before, during or after the marriage, and each is 
hereby ordered to hold the other harmless from liability thereon. Petitioner is hereby ordered to 
assume and pay the obligation on the 2003 Saab. 
16. MUTUAL PROTECTIVE ORDER: A permanent mutual protective order is 
hereby ordered as to both parties, with each party being permanently restrained from attempting, 
committing, or threatening to commit domestic violence or abuse against the other, and each 
being permanently ordered not stalk, harass, or threaten, or use or attempt to use physical force 
that would reasonably be expected to cause physical injury to the other. Each party is hereby 
permanently restrained from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, e-mailing 
or otherwise communicating with the other. Each party is hereby permanently ordered to stay 
away from the other's residence and premises, and stay away from the school, place of 
employment and/or other places and their premises, frequented by the other party. 
17. NAME CHANGE: Petitioner is hereby restored to her birthname of 
"CASTILLO". 
18. DOCUMENTATION. Within ten (10) days from the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce and, from time to time as circumstances may require, each party is hereby ordered to 
execute and deliver to the other any and all documents that are required to accomplish and 
implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce, including deeds, titles and any and all other 
documents. 
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19. FUNDS EXCHANGE DATE: The judgments against Respondent for delinquent 
child support of $2,384.00; child care expenses of $3,838.92, and medical expenses of 
. $1,024.81, for a total of $7,247.73 are hereby ordered offset against the $9,600.00 to be paid by 
/ 
Petitioner to Respondent for his share of the marital personal property. The remaining balance of 
$2,352.27, along with the $14,000.00 reimbursement of Respondent's personal injury settlement 
funds are hereby ordered paid by Petitioner to Respondent within thirty (30) days from the date 
of entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
20. ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS: Each party is hereby ordered to pay his or 
her own attorney fees and costs incurred herein. 
SO ORDERED this I~ ( /dayof 
LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SMART SCHOFIELD SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
SAMUEL M. BARKER >: *$ * * * 
BRADLEY J. SCHOFIELD *\ K r }/* ; 
Attorneys for Defendant , %.# pr w .< 
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ADDENDUM "C 
Glen M.Richman (#2752) 
Barbara W. Richman (#1707) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
.60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
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TRAVIS PAUL JOHNSON, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 044907342 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
This matter having been tried before the Court, the Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis, on 
May 3, May 9, 2006, and July 6, 2006, and the parties having entered into certain stipulations 
pertaining to facts and issues herein, and having provided testimony and presented documentary 
evidence, and other witnesses for each of the parties having been called and having given 
testimony in support of the respective causes of Petitioner and Respondent, and the Court having 
considered the stipulations of the parties, and the testimony and evidence presented by each 
party, and being fully advised in the premises, and after hearing arguments of counsel, now 
makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A Decree of Divorce was entered herein on the 25th day of April, 2005, terminating 
the marriage of the parties but reserving all remaining issues for resolution by subsequent Order. 
All remaining issues are hereby resolved. 
2. CUSTODY: The parties have one (1) child bom as issue of the marriage, 
GABRIEL JOHNSON, bom January 1, 2003. Petitioner has had the temporary sole legal and 
physical custody of said minor child during the pendency of this action. Petitioner is a fit and 
proper person to be awarded the permanent sole legal and physical custody of said minor child. 
3. PARENT-TIME: Respondent's parent-time with the minor child has been governed 
by a Protective Order issued on April 21, 2005 in Case No. 054901214, and provides for 
supervised visits by WillWin. The Office of Guardian ad Litem should be appointed in this case. 
Respondent's parent-time with the child should be under the following conditions: Respondent 
is to undergo a five panel drug test at his sole cost and expense prior to each visitation with the 
child. A reduction of drug tests may occur only after a significant period of time has passed and 
the Guardian ad Litem has approved a reduction. The Court would then consider and a written 
Order must follow for the reduction. Until that time drug tests are to occur prior to every 
visitation and the drug test results are to be provided to Petitioner, to Pamela G. Johnson the 
parent-time supervisor, and to the Court. If the drug test is positive then the visitation is not to 
occur. Pamela G. Johnson is to supervise the visitation and remain present during the entire 
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visitation. Her other son that has a drug problem is not to be present during visits. Visitation 
will be every other Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. On the weekend a visitation does not 
9fcfcur, a visitation will occur on Monday from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. The first weeknight 
visitation will begin on Monday, May 15, 2006. There are to be no overnight visitations at this 
time. Respondent is to attend three (3) AA meetings per week and provide proof to the court. 
Neither Petitioner nor Respondent is to use alcohol or drugs 48 hours prior to being with the 
child, unless the medications are prescribed. 
4. INCOME: Petitioner receives monthly annuity payments as a result of a 
structured settlement arising from injuries she received as a young child, and income from 
investment accounts and certain assets invested in an irrevocable trust resulting in average gross 
monthly income of $8,977.00. Respondent receives a monthly annuity payment of $425.00 from 
settlement of a personal injury claim. Respondent has been voluntarily unemployed but 
represented that he had been hired foil time at Convergys beginning May 15, 2006 and will earn 
$9.15 per hour for monthly income of $1,586.00. Respondent's gross monthly income is 
$2,011.00. 
5. CHILD SUPPORT: The base child support calculation using each party's 
respective gross income and Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15 is set forth in the Child Support 
Worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit A, and Respondent is required to pay to Petitioner the sum 
of $149.00 per month as and for child support for the one (1) minor child of the parties until such 
time as said child attains age 18 and finishes high school in the normal year of graduation. The 
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payment schedule provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.5 should be applicable; the abatement 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.11 should be applicable; the delinquency consequences 
Qf Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-4 and -5 shoul(j be applicable, and the adjustment provisions of 
UtahCode Ann. § 78-45-7.10 should be applicable. 
6. DELINQUENT CHILD SUPPORT: Respondent has paid no child support since 
the entry of the Temporary Order on April 26, 2005 and therefore is delinquent in child support 
payments at the rate of $149.00 per month for the period of time commencing with April, 2005 
through August, 2006, or 17 months, for a total delinquency of $2,533.00. 
7. CHILD CARE EXPENSES: Pursuant to the Temporary Order entered April 27, 
2005 each of the parties was ordered to be responsible for one half of the preschool (day care ) 
charges incurred on behalf of the minor child, Since entry of the Temporary Order and through 
April 27, 2006 a total of $7,677.85 was incurred for the minor child's pre-school expenses. 
Respondent has failed to pay one-half of the charges which totals $3,838.92. In accordance with 
the provisions and procedures of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16 each party should pay one-half of 
all day care and child care expenses incurred from and after April 27, 2006 for the benefit of the 
parties' minor child. 
8. MEDICAL EXPENSES: Pursuant to the Temporary Order entered April 27, 
2005 each of the parties was ordered to be responsible for one half of the hospital, dental and 
medical care expenses incxirred for the minor child. Through December 14, 2005 a total of 
$2,049
 s62 in medical expenses was incurred for the minor child. Respondent has failed to pay 
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one-half of the charges which totals $1,024.81. In accordance with the provisions and 
procedures of Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7-15, each party shall assume and pay one-half of any and 
all premiums, hospital, medical, deductibles, and dental expenses which may be incurred from 
and after December 14, 2005 by or on behalf of the minor child during his minority, and which 
are not otherwise paid by insurance, promptly upon presentation of the billing to the other. 
9. INCOME TAX EXEMPTION: Petitioner should be allowed to claim the 
minor child as her tax dependent for each tax year beginning with 2005 and thereafter. 
10. ALIMONY: Each party is self supporting or capable of self support and neither 
has a need for alimony from the other. No alimony should be awarded to either party from the 
other. 
11. REAL PROPERTY: The real property situated at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, 
Draper, Utah, 84020 was purchased by Petitioner from her separate, pre-marital funds and assets. 
Title to said real property was taken by Petitioner individually. Respondent was never included 
or named as an owner on the title to said real property. Petitioner was the sole applicant of and 
obligor on the obligation which encumbers the real property. All payments of the mortgage 
principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. All payments of the real 
property taxes and insurance were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. 
12. RESPONDENT'S PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT: During the marriage 
of the parties Respondent received a personal injury settlement of approximately $24,000.00 
which was deposited into Petitioner's individual checking account. Petitioner paid 
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approximately $10,000.00 for Respondent's medical bills for injuries received in the incident 
giving rise to the personal injury settlement. Petitioner should reimburse Respondent the sum of 
£14,000.00. 
13. VEHICLES: 
A. 2003 Saab. During the marriage the parties jointly purchased a 2003 
Saab vehicle. The purchase of the vehicle was jointly financed by the parties through WFS 
Financial. Paragraph 5 of the Temporary Order entered April 27, 2005 provided: 
5. Respondent shall have the use of the Saab vehicle 
subject to keeping the payments made in a timely manner 
and holding Petitioner harmless from liability thereon. In 
the event Respondent is delinquent on any payment on the 
financing of the Saab automobile the possession shall 
immediately revert to the Petitioner as her sole and separate 
property and she may take possession of the same with or 
without the assistance of an officer of the law and dispose 
of the vehicle as she wishes. 
As stated in the Affidavit of Petitioner filed June 17, 2005 Respondent failed to remain current in 
the payment on the Saab. Petitioner took possession of the Saab and was required to pay for 
repairs totaling $179.59 to make the vehicle drivable. Additional needed repairs are estimated at 
$796.59. The vehicle was in considerable disrepair when Petitioner took possession which has 
devalued it from the current average retail NADA value of $18,200 to $10,500. The balance 
owing on the obligation in favor of WTS Financial as of April 12, 2006 is $19,962.60. In 
accordance with the Temporary Order entered April 27, 2005, the 2003 Saab is Petitioner's 
separate property and not marital property. 
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B. Chevrolet Prism. During the marriage Petitioner purchased a Chevrolet 
Prism vehicle which is physically located in the state of Alaska. Respondent should be awarded 
4
 tH6 Chevrolet Prism and Petitioner should deliver clear title to him. Respondent is to obtain 
possession of the Chevrolet Prism in the state of Alaska at his sole cost and expense. 
C. 2002 Hyundai: Prior to the marriage of the parties Petitioner owned a 2002 
Hyundai Santa Fe vehicle which she purchased with her separate funds and assets. Petitioner 
holds title to said vehicle in her own name. Respondent did not provide funds to purchase the 
vehicle and has never been included on the title to said vehicle. The Hyundai is Petitioner's 
separate property and not marital property. 
14. PERSONAL MARITAL PROPERTY: Each of the parties owned personal 
property prior to their marriage. Each party has possession of his or her separate personal 
property which each owned prior to the marriage. Each party should be awarded those items of 
marital property which each has in his or her respective possession as of the date of trial. 
Respondent should be awarded the Apple computer. With respect to marital property which has 
been sold or otherwise disposed of, Petitioner should pay Respondent $4,000 for the dining table, 
$2,500 for the living room furniture, $3,000 for the bedroom set, $100 for the punching bag, and 
$1,900.00 for a plasma TV and a secretary desk, for a total of $11,500.00. The money is to be 
paid within 30 days from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
15. DEBTS: Each party should assume and pay all debts and obligations in his or her 
separate name, whether incurred before, during or after the marriage, and should hold the other 
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harmless for liability thereon. Petitioner should assume and pay the obligation on the 2003 Saab. 
16. MUTUAL PROTECTIVE ORDER: A permanent protective order should remain 
hiy place as to both parties, with each party .being permanently restrained from attempting, 
committing, or threatening to commit domestic violence or abuse against the other, and each 
shall not stalk, harass, or threaten, or use or attempt to use physical force that would reasonably 
be expected to cause physical injury to the other. Each party should be permanently restrained 
from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, e-mailing or otherwise 
communicating with the other. Each party should be permanently ordered to stay away from the 
other's residence and premises, and stay away from the school, place of employment and/or 
other places and their premises, frequented by the other party. 
17. NAME CHANGE: Defendant's Counter Petition for Divorce at paragraph 27 
suggested that Plaintiff be restored to her birth name of "CASTILLO" and Petitioner's Answer 
to the Counter Petition agreed. 
18. DOCUMENTATION. Within ten (10) days from the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce and, from time to time as circumstances may require, each party shall execute and 
deliver to the other any and all documents that are required to accomplish and implement the 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce, including deeds, titles and any and all other documents. 
19. FUNDS EXCHANGE DATE: The judgments against Respondent for delinquent 
child support of $2,533.00; child care expenses of $3,838.92, and medical expenses of 
$1,024.81, for a total of $7,396.73 should be offset against the $11,500.00 to be paid by 
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Petitioner to Respondent for his share of the marital property. The remaining balance of 
$4,103.27, along with the $14,000.00 reimbursement of Respondent's personal injury settlement 
' filfids shall be paid by Petitioner to Respondent, within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of 
the Decree of Divorce. 
20. ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS: Petitioner has incurred a total of $40,923.03 
in attorney fees and costs in this action as shown on an Affidavit filed by Petitioner's attorneys. 
Respondent's attorneys filed an Affidavit on July 6, 2006 which fails to itemize the services 
performed, the time expended, and the charges for each item. Petitioner is the prevailing party 
on the disputed issues of child custody and the ownership and appreciation of the real property. 
Petitioner has sufficient assets and ability to pay her own attorney fees. Respondent does not 
have the ability to pay Petitioner's attorney fees. Each party should pay his or her own attorney 
fees and costs incurred herein. 
Having reviewed the file and record in this matter, having made and entered the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, and having been fully informed in the premises, the Court hereby 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
21. CUSTODY: Petitioner should be awarded the permanent sole legal and physical 
custody of the one (1) child born as issue of the marriage, GABRIEL JOHNSON, born January 
1,2003. 
22. PARENT-TIME: Respondent's parent-time with the child should be under the 
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guidance of The Office of Guardian ad Litem which has been appointed in this case and should 
take place under the following conditions: Respondent is to undergo a five panel drug test at his 
sole cost and expense prior to each visitation with the child. A reduction of drug tests may occur 
only after a significant period of time has passed and the Guardian ad Litem has approved a 
reduction. The Court would then consider and a written Order must follow for the reduction. 
Until that time drug tests are to occur prior to every visitation and the drug test results are to be 
provided to Petitioner, to Pamela G. Johnson the parent-time supervisor, and to the Court. If the 
drug test is positive then the visitation is not to occur. Pamela G. Johnson is to supervise the 
visitation and remain present during the entire visitation. Her other son that has a drug problem 
is not to be present during visits. Visitation will be every other Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 
p.m. On the weekend a visitation does not occur, a visitation will occur on Monday from 4:00 
p.m. to 7:00 p.m. The first weeknight visitation will begin on Monday, May 15, 2006. There are 
to be no overnight visitations at this time. Respondent is to attend three (3) AA meetings per 
week and provide proof to the court. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent is to use alcohol or 
drugs 48 hours prior to being with the child, unless the medications are prescribed. 
23. INCOME: Petitioner's gross monthly income is $8,977.00. Respondent's 
gross monthly income is $2,011.00. 
24. CHILD SUPPORT: The base child support calculation using each party's 
respective gross income and Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15 is set forth in the Child Support 
Worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit A, and Respondent is required to pay to Petitioner the sum 
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of $149.00 per month as and for child support for the one (1) minor child of the parties until such 
time as said child attains age 18 and finishes high school in the normal year of graduation. The 
payment schedule provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.5 should be applicable; the abatement 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.11 should be applicable; the delinquency consequences 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-4 and -5 should be applicable, and the adjustment provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.10 should be applicable. 
25. DELINQUENT CHILD SUPPORT: Respondent has paid no child support since 
the entry of the Temporary Order on April 26, 2005 and therefore is delinquent in child support 
payments at the rate of $149.00 per month for the period of time commencing with Aprils 2005 
through August, 2006, or 17 months, for a total delinquency of $2,533.00. The delinquent child 
support owed by Respondent should be offset against sums payable by Petitioner to Respondent. 
26. CHILD CARE EXPENSES: Pursuant to the Temporary Order entered April 27, 
2005 each of the parties was ordered to be responsible for one half of the preschool (day care ) 
charges incurred on behalf of the minor child. Since entry of the Temporary Order and through 
April 27, 2006 a total of $7,677.85 was incurred for the minor child's pre-school expenses. 
Respondent has failed to pay one-half of the charges which totals $3,838,92. The delinquent 
child care/preschool expenses owed by Respondent should be offset against sums payable by 
Petitioner to Respondent. In accordance with the provisions and procedures of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.16 each party should pay one-half of all day care and child care expenses incurred 
from and after April 27,2006 for the benefit of the parties' minor child. 
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27. MEDICAL EXPENSES: Pursuant to the Temporary Order entered April 27, 
2005 each of the parties was ordered to be responsible for one half of the hospital, dental and 
riifcdical care expenses incurred for the minor child. Through December 14, 2005 a total of 
$2,049.62 in medical expenses was incurred for the minor child. Respondent has failed to pay 
one-half of the charges which totals $1,024.81. The delinquent medical expenses owed by 
Respondent should be offset against sums payable by Petitioner to Respondent. In accordance 
with the provisions and procedures of Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7-15, each party shall assume and 
pay one-half of any and all premiums, hospital, medical, deductibles, and dental expenses which 
may be incurred from and after December 14, 2005 by or on behalf of the minor child during his 
minority, and which are not otherwise paid by insurance, promptly upon presentation of the 
billing to the other. 
28. INCOME TAX EXEMPTION: Petitioner should be allowed to claim the 
minor child as her tax dependent beginning with tax year 2005 and thereafter. 
29. ALIMONY: Each party is self supporting or capable of self support and neither 
has a need for alimony from the other. No alimony should be awarded to either party from the 
other. 
30. REAL PROPERTY: The real property situated at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, 
Draper, Utah, 84020 was purchased by Petitioner from her separate, pre-marital funds and assets. 
Title to said real property was taken by Petitioner individually. Respondent was never included 
or named as an owner on the title to said real property. Petitioner was the sole applicant of and 
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obligor on the obligation which encumbers the real property. All payments of the mortgage 
principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. All payments of the real 
ptoperty taxes and insurance were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. The real property 
situated at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, Draper, Utah, 84020 is and always has been 
Petitioner's separate property and all appreciation in value of said real property is Petitioner's 
separate property. 
31. RESPONDENT'S PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT: During the marriage 
of the parties Respondent received a personal injury settlement of approximately $24,000.00 
which was deposited into Petitioner's individual checking account. Petitioner paid 
approximately $10,000.00 for Respondent's medical bills for injuries received in the incident 
giving rise to the personal injury settlement. Petitioner should reimburse Respondent the sum of 
$14,000.00. 
32, VEHICLES: 
A. 2003 Saab, During the marriage the parties jointly purchased a 2003 
Saab vehicle. The purchase of the vehicle was jointly financed by the parties through WFS 
Financial. Paragraph 5 of the Temporary Order entered April 27, 2005 provided: 
5. Respondent shall have the use of the Saab vehicle 
subject to keeping the payments made in a timely manner 
and holding Petitioner harmless from liability thereon. In 
the event Respondent is delinquent on any payment on the 
financing of the Saab automobile the possession shall 
immediately revert to the Petitioner as her sole and separate 
property and she may take possession of the same with or 
without the assistance of an officer of the law and dispose 
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-of the vehicle as she wishes. 
As stated in the Affidavit of Petitioner filed June 17, 2005 Respondent failed to remain current in 
the payment on the Saab. Petitioner took possession of the Saab and was required to pay for 
repairs totaling $179.59 to make the vehicle drivable. Additional needed repairs are estimated at 
$796.59. The vehicle was in considerable disrepair when Petitioner took possession which has 
devalued it from the current average retail NAD A value of $18,200 to $10,500. The balance 
owing on the obligation in favor of WTS Financial as of April 12, 2006 is $19,^62.60. In 
accordance with the Temporary Order entered April 27, 2005, the 2003 Saab is Petitioner's 
separate property and not marital property. 
B. Chevrolet Prism. During the marriage Petitioner purchased a Chevrolet 
Prism vehicle which is physically located in the state of Alaska. Respondent should be awarded 
the Chevrolet Prism and Petitioner should deliver clear title to him. Respondent is to obtain 
possession of the Chevrolet Prism in the state of Alaska at his sole cost and expense. 
C. 2002 Hyundai: Prior to the marriage of the parties Petitioner owned a 2002 
Hyundai Santa Fe vehicle which she purchased with her separate funds and assets. Petitioner 
holds title to said vehicle in her own name. Respondent did not provide funds to purchase the 
vehicle and has never been included on the title to said vehicle. The Hyundai is Petitioner's 
separate property and not marital property. 
33. PERSONAL MARITAL PROPERTY: Each of the parties owned personal 
property prior to their marriage. Each party has possession of his or her separate personal 
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property which each owned prior to the marriage. Each party should be awarded those items of 
marital property which each has in his or her respective possession as of the date of trial. 
Respondent should be awarded the Apple computer. With respect to marital property which has 
been sold or otherwise disposed of, Petitioner should pay Respondent $4,000 for the dining table, 
$2,500 for the living room furniture, $3,000 for the bedroom set, $100 for the punching bag, and 
$1,900 for the plasma TV and a secretary desk, for a total of $11,500.00. 
34. DEBTS: Each party should assume and pay all debts and obligations in his or her 
separate name, whether incurred before, during or after the marriage, and should hold the other 
harmless for liability thereon. Petitioner should assume and pay the obligation on the 2003 Saab. 
35. MUTUAL PROTECTIVE ORDER: A permanent protective order should remain 
in place as to both parties, with each party being permanently restrained from attempting, 
committing, or threatening to commit domestic violence or abuse against the other, and each 
shall not stalk, harass, or threaten, or use or attempt to use physical force that would reasonably 
be expected to cause physical injury to the other. Each party should be permanently restrained 
from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, e-mailing or otherwise 
communicating with the other. Each party should be permanently ordered to stay away from the 
other's residence and premises, and stay away from the school, place of employment and/or 
other places and their premises, frequented by the other party. 
36. NAME CHANGE: Petitioner should be restored to her birth name of 
"CASTILLO". 
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37. DOCUMENTATION: Within ten (10) days from the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, and from time to time as the circumstances may require, each party shall execute and 
dbliver to the other any and all documents that are required to accomplish and implement the 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce, including deeds, titles and any and all other documents. 
38. FUNDS EXCHANGE DATE: The delinquent child support, unpaid child care and 
day care expenses, and medical expenses owed by Respondent to Petitioner as set forth herein 
i 
which total $7,396.73 shall be offset against the $11,500.00 payable by Petitioner to Respondent, 
leaving a balance payable by Petitioner to Respondent of $4,103.27 which is to be paid to 
Respondent within 30 days from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce along with the 
$14,000.00 reimbursement by Petitioner to Respondent from his personal injury settlement 
funds. 
39. ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS: Petitioner has incurred a total of $40,923.03 
in attorney fees and costs in this action as shown on an Affidavit filed by Petitioner's attorneys. 
Respondent's attorneys filed an Affidavit on July 6, 2006 which fails to itemize the services 
performed, the time expended, and the charges for each item. Petitioner was the prevailing party 
on all disputed issues including child custody and the ownership and appreciation of the real 
property. Petitioner has sufficient assets and ability to pay her own attorney fees. Respondent 
does not have the ability to pay Petitioner's attorney fees. Each party should pay his or her 
separate attorney fees and costs incurred in this action. 
Castillo-Johnson v. Johnson 16 
CaseNo.044907324 
X:\Richman\Castillo-Johnson\Decree\p-ff & cl.doc 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY this fl day of 
•<$€4^yfT2006. 
BY THE COURT: /H 
LESEffi A. LEWIS, JUDGE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SMART SCHOFIELD SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
BRADLEY J. SCHOFIELD 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 +<S 
4 + 
/ . * * 
. ^ t ^ r a ^ f 
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ADDENDUM "D 
Glen M. Richman (#2752) 
Barbara W. Richman (#1707) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
.60 South 600 East, Suite 100 OF JUDGMENTS 
S4lt Lake City, Utah 84102 DATE __ji|ilLL£v£ 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




TRAVIS PAUL JOHNSON, 
H 
1 Respondent. 
AMENDED DECREE AND JUDGMENT 
RESOLVING ALL ISSUES AND 
PERMANENT MUTUAL PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
1 Case No. 044907342 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
1 Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. | 
This matter having been tried before the Court, the Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis, on 
May 3, May 9, 2006, and July 6, 2006, and the parties having entered into certain stipulations 
pertaining to facts and issues herein, and having provided testimony and presented documentary 
evidence, and other witnesses for each of the parties having been called and having given 
testimony in support of the respective causes of Petitioner and Respondent, and the Court having 
considered the stipulations of the parties, and the testimony and evidence presented by each 
party, and being fully advised in the premises, and after hearing arguments of counsel, and the 
Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and 
enters the following: 
Amended Decree and Judgment Resolving All Issues, 
jrv?nQn*ne4 
Third Judicial District 
SE? 2 S 2008 
Deouty Clerk 
DECREE AND JUDGMENT RESOLVING ALL ISSUES 
1. A Decree of Divorce was entered herein on the 25th day of April, 2005, terminating 
the marriage of the parties but reserving all remaining issues for resolution by subsequent Order. 
All remaining issues are hereby decreed and adjudged herein. 
2. CUSTODY: Petitioner is hereby awarded the permanent sole legal and physical 
custody of the one (1) child born as issue of the marriage, GABRIEL JOHNSON, born January 
1,2003. 
3. PARENT-TIME: Respondent's parent-time with the child is hereby ordered to be 
under the guidance of the Office of Guardian ad Litem which has been appointed in this case and 
is hereby ordered to take place under the following conditions: Respondent is to undergo a five 
panel drug test at his sole cost and expense prior to each visitation with the child. A reduction of 
drug tests may occur only after a significant period of time has passed and the Guardian ad Litem 
has approved a reduction. The Court would then consider and a written Order must follow for 
the reduction. Until that time drug tests are to occur prior to every visitation and the drug test 
results are to be provided to Petitioner, to Pamela G. Johnson the parent-time supervisor, and to 
the Court. If the drug test is positive then the visitation is not to occur. Pamela G. Johnson is to 
supervise the visitation and remain present during the entire visitation. Her other son that has a 
drug problem is not to be present during visits. Visitation will be every other Saturday from 8:00 
a.m. to 1:00 p.m. On the weekend a visitation does not occur, a visitation will occur on Monday 
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from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. The first weeknight visitation will begin on Monday, May 15, 2006. 
There are to be no overnight visitations at this time. Respondent is to attend three (3) AA 
meetings per week and provide proof to the court. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent is to use 
alcohol or drugs 48 hours prior to being with the child, unless the medications are prescribed. 
4. INCOME: Petitioner's gross monthly income is $8,977.00. Respondent's 
gross monthly income is $2,011.00. 
5. CHILD SUPPORT: The base child support calculation using each party's 
respective gross income and Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15 is set forth in the Child Support 
Worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit A, and Respondent is hereby ordered to pay to Petitioner 
the sum of $149.00 per month as and for child support for the one (1) minor child of the parties 
until such time as said child attains age 18 and finishes high school in the normal year of 
graduation. The payment schedule provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.5 are hereby ordered 
applicable; the abatement provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.11 are hereby ordered 
applicable; the delinquency consequences of Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-4 and -5 are hereby 
ordered applicable, and the adjustment provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.10 are hereby 
ordered applicable. 
6. CHILD CARE EXPENSES: In accordance with the provisions and procedures of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16 each party should pay one-half of all day care and child care 
expenses incurred from and after April 27, 2006 for the benefit of the parties' minor child. 
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7. MEDICAL EXPENSES: In accordance with the provisions and procedures of 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7-15. each party shall assume and pay one-half of any and all premiums, 
hospital, medical, deductibles, and dental expenses which may be incurred from and after 
December 14, 2005 by or on behalf of the minor child during his minority, and which are not 
otherwise paid by insurance, promptly upon presentation of the billing to the other. 
8. DELINQUENT CHILD SUPPORT: PRESCHOOL/DAYCARE EXPENSES: 
and MEDICAL EXPENSES, AND ORDER OF OFFSET: Petitioner is hereby awarded 
judgment against Respondent for delinquent child support payments at the rate of $149.00 per 
month for the period of time commencing with April, 2005 through August, 2006, or 17 months, 
for a total judgment of $2,533.00. Petitioner is hereby awarded judgment against Respondent for 
one half of the preschool (day care) charges incurred on behalf of the minor child since entry of 
the Temporary Order and through April 27, 2006 which total $7,677.85, one-half of which totals 
$3,838.92. Petitioner is hereby awarded judgment against Respondent for one half of the 
hospital, dental and medical care expenses incurred for the minor child since entry of the 
Temporary Order and through December 14, 2005 which total $2,049.62, one-half of which 
totals $1,024.81. The total delinquency of $7,396.73 is hereby ordered offset against sums 
payable by Petitioner to Respondent and set forth herein. 
9. INCOME TAX EXEMPTION: Petitioner is hereby awarded the right to 
claim the minor child as her tax dependent beginning with tax year 2005 and thereafter, 
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1U. ALIMONY: No alimony is awarded to either party from the other and alimony 
is ordered forever waived. 
11. REAL PROPERTY: The real property situated at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, 
Draper, Utah, 84020 is hereby ordered Petitioner's separate property and all appreciation in 
value of said real property is hereby ordered Petitioner's separate property* 
12. RESPONDENT'S PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT: Petitioner is hereby 
ordered to reimburse Respondent the sum of $14,000.00 of Respondent's personal injury 
settlement received during the marriage of the parties. 
13. VEHICLES: 
A. 2003 Saab, In accordance with the Temporary Order entered April 27, 
2005, the 2003 Saab is Petitioner's separate property and not marital property and the 2003 Saab 
is awarded to Petitioner subject to the encumbrance thereon. 
B. Chevrolet Prism. Respondent is hereby awarded the Chevrolet Prism and 
Petitioner is hereby ordered to deliver clear title to him. Respondent is hereby ordered to obtain 
possession of the Chevrolet Prism in the state of Alaska at his sole cost and expense. 
C. 2002 Hyundai: The 2002 Hyundai Santa Fe vehicle is hereby ordered 
Petitioner's separate property and not marital property and the 2002 Hyundai Santa Fe vehicle 
which is free of encumbrance is awarded to Petitioner. 
14. PERSONAL MARITAL PROPERTY: Each party is hereby awarded the 
items of personal property which each owned prior to the marriage and which are in his or her 
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respective possession as of the date of trial. Each party is hereby awarded those items of marital 
property which each has in his or her respective possession as of the date of trial. Respondent is 
^warded the Apple computer. With respect to tijiarital property which has been sold or otherwise 
disposed of, Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay Respondent $4,000 for the dining table, $2,500 
for the living room furniture, $3,000 for the bedroom set, $100 for the punching bag, $1,900 for 
the plasma TV and the secretary desk, for a total of $11,500.00. 
15. DEBTS: Each party is hereby ordered to assume and pay all debts and obligations 
in his or her separate name, whether incurred before, during or after the marriage, and each is 
hereby ordered to hold the other harmless from liability thereon. Petitioner is hereby ordered to 
assume and pay the obligation on the 2003 Saab. 
16. MUTUAL PROTECTIVE ORDER: A permanent mutual protective order is 
hereby ordered as to both parties, with each party being permanently restrained from attempting, 
committing, or threatening to commit domestic violence or abuse against the other, and each 
being permanently ordered not stalk, harass, or threaten, or use or attempt to use physical force 
that would reasonably be expected to cause physical injury to the other. Each party is hereby 
permanently restrained from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, e-mailing 
or otherwise communicating with the other. Each party is hereby permanently ordered to stay 
away from the other's residence and premises, and stay away from the school, place of 
employment and/or other places and their premises, frequented by the other party, 
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17. NAME CHANGE: Petitioner is hereby restored to her birth name of 
"CASTILLO". 
18. DOCUMENTATION: Within ten (10) days from the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce and, from time to time as circumstances may require, each party is hereby ordered to 
execute and deliver to the other any and all documents that are required to accomplish and 
implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce, including deeds, titles and any and all other 
documents. 
19. FUNDS EXCHANGE DATE: The judgments against Respondent for delinquent 
child support of $2,533.00; child care expenses of $3,838.92, and medical expenses of 
$1,024.81, for a total of $7,396.73 are hereby ordered offset against the $11,500.00 to be paid by 
Petitioner to Respondent for his share of the marital personal property. The remaining balance of 
$4,103.27, along with the $14,000.00 reimbursement of Respondent's personal injury settlement 
funds are hereby ordered paid by Petitioner to Respondent within thirty (30) days from the date 
of entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
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20. ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS: Each party is hereby ordered to pay his or 
her own attorney fees and costs incurred herein.* 
SO ORDERED this JS^day of 
LES1XE A. LEWIS, JUDGE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SMART SCHOFIELD SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
BRADLEY J. SCHOFIELD 
Attorneys for Defendant 
".. *• * < 
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MAIL PAYMENTS TO: 
RO, Box 58025 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158-0025 
Phone (801) 481-8800 Universi 
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